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DEDUCTIVE MODELING TO DETERMINE AN
OPTIMUM JURY SIZE AND FRACTION
REQUIRED TO CONVICT*
by Stuart S. Nagel** and Marian Neef***
I. THE BAsIc PROBLEM
In 1970, the United States Supreme Court held in Williams v.
Florida' that due process is not violated if a state chooses to conduct
criminal cases with six-person juries rather than twelve-person juries.
Two years later, in Apodaca v. Oregon,2 the Court held that due
process is not violated if a state chooses to have juries decide criminal
cases by a majority of ten out of twelve jurors. Those cases were
followed by a substantial literature,3 but there is still no systematic
* This Article is based on a longer paper presented in the workshop on "Science
and Technology in Criminal Justice" at the 1975 annual meeting of the American Soci-
ety for Public Administration. The authors appreciate the helpful suggestions made by
Allen Barton of the Columbia Bureau of Applied Social Research, Peter Aranson of
Georgia Institute of Technology. W.G. Leight of the National Bureau of Standards,
John Murphy of the University of Cincinnati Law School, Richard Lempert of the Uni-
versity of Michigan Law School, and Sarah Schramm of George Washington University.
The authors are also grateful to the LEAA National Institute, the Ford Foundation Pub-
lic Policy Committee, and the University of Illinois Law and Society Program for fi-
nancing the research of which this Article is a part, although none of these groups are
responsible for the ideas advocated here.
** Professor of Political Science, University of Illinois; member of the Illinois Bar.
B.S., 1957, J.D., 1958, Ph.D., 1961, Northwestern University.
*** Ph.D. Candidate, Department of Political Science, University of Illinois. B.A.,
1973, M.A., 1974, University of Illinois.
1. 399 U.S. 78 (1970). In Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149 (1973), the Court
held that a jury of six persons satisfies the seventh amendment guarantee of trial by jury
in civil cases.
2. 406 U.S. 404 (1972). On the same day, the Court upheld the Louisiana pro-
visions that permitted conviction of defendants in certain noncapital criminal cases by
a majority of nine out of twelve jurors. Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356 (1972).
3. See, e.g., INsTTruTE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION, A COMPARISON OF SIx- AND
TWELVE-MEMBER CIVIL JuREs IN NEW JERSEY SuPEmOR AND CouNTY COURTS (1973)
(containing bibliography); Symposium-The Jury, 10 TAmr, Nov., Dec. 1974, at 11;
Zeisel .... And Then There Were None: The Diminution of the Federal Jury, 38 U.
Cmu. L REv. 710 (1971). There have been several important studies of the effects of
changing jury size. E.g., INsTrruTE or JuniCL ADMNISTRATiON, supra; E. Beiser, The
Trial Jury: Empirical and Normative Considerations (paper presented at the annual
meeting of the American Political Science Association, 1973); Mill, Six-Member and
933
Washington University Open Scholarship
934 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
analysis of the fundamental issue raised by Williams and Apodaca:
What is the relation between jury size, or a requirement of unanimity,
and conviction of the guilty and acquittal of the innocent?
A. Inability of Empirical Data to Indicate Effects of Jury Size
Prior studies have mainly considered the effect of the Supreme Court
decisions on the representativeness of juries or the probability of convic-
tion rather than examining the probability of convicting the innocent or
acquitting the guilty. These studies have been especially concerned
with actual decisions, comparing decisions by twelve-person juries with
those by six-person juries or comparing decisions by unanimous juries
with those by nonunanimous juries. Such comparisons tend to have
limited meaning, however, because there is no way to control for differ-
ences in the cases that are presented to the alternative kinds of juries.
Despite the lack of experimental controls, significant data can be
collected from some empirical research. For instance, the University of
Chicago Jury Project took a nationwide sample of 3,576 jury trials in
which twelve-person juries had been required to give unanimous ver-
dicts. The Project found that in 64.2 percent of the trials, the juries
returned verdicts of guilty, resulting in the defendants' convictions; in
30.3 percent, the juries returned verdicts of not guilty, resulting in the
defendants' acquittals; in the remaining 5.5 percent, the juries were
hung juries, that is, unable to reach unanimous decisions.5 If a state
conformed to the national average before the Williams case, what would
it mean if, after Williams, the state adopted six-person juries and its
juries still convicted 64 percent of the time?
The same conviction rate would not mean that a change in jury size
had no effect on the probability of conviction. Presumably, defense
counsel would be more willing to bring their weak cases before a twelve-
person jury than before a six-person jury. Defendants' weak cases are
those in which the jury is more likely to convict. On the other hand,
prosecutors would probably be more willing to bring their weak cases
before a six-person jury than before a twelve-person jury. Prosecutors'
Twelve-Member Juries: An Empirical Study of Trial Results, 6 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM
671 (1973). For important deductive mathematical models of the effects of changing
jury size, including references, see note 30 infra.
4. See sources cited in note 3 supra.
5. H. KALVEN & H. ZIsEL, THm AmmucAN JuRY 56 (1966) [hereinafter cited as
KALVEN & ZEISEL].
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weak cases are those in which the jury is more likely to acquit. These
two effects may offset each other in such a way that the cases brought
before six-person juries result in the same 64-percent conviction rate
observed in a different sample of cases brought before twelve-person
juries. Even if we are certain that smaller juries are easier to persuade
and hence more likely to convict-all other things being equal-they
may in fact convict only 40 percent of the time because defense counsel
plea-bargain weak cases and bring only especially strong cases before
the small six-person juries. We cannot interpret actual changes, or
predict future changes, simply by observing the juries themselves.
The situation is further complicated by the possibility that in jurisdic-
tions permitting the election of jury size less severe cases may tend to go
before six-person juries and more severe cases before twelve-person
juries. On the one hand, juries may have a greater tendency to convict
in more serious cases because juries want those cases resolved or because
prosecutors prepare better for them. On the other hand, juries may be
less likely to convict in more serious cases because juries are more afraid
of making a mistake or because defense counsel are better prepared.
These conflicting forces make empirical comparisons between cases
heard by twelve-person and six-person juries virtually meaningless, at
least with regard to the important issue: What is the likelihood that an
average defendant-whether truly guilty or innocent-will be convicted
if he is brought to trial before a twelve-person rather than a six-person
jury? In other words, what is the probability, given various assump-
tions, that a jury of a given size will render a correct verdict? If we
could randomly assign a large number of cases to twelve-person juries
and to six-person juries, we could then compare the results, because the
large sample sizes would tend to make two random samples virtually
identical. Any differences in the results would then be attributable to
the difference in jury size." This kind of randomization, even if practi-
cal, might be unconstitutional, however, because one or the other group
of defendants would be favored without adequate justification.
As an alternative to this experiment, Zeisel and Diamond suggest
having criminal cases decided simultaneously by twelve-person and six-
person juries.' The decision of only one of the two juries would deter-
mine the defendant's fate. The jurors on the nondeterminative jury
6. See Zeisel & Diamond, "Convincing Empirfical Evidence" on the Six Member
Jury, 41 U. CHI. L. REv. 281 (1974).
7. Id.
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might be affected, however, by the knowledge that their verdict will
have no practical effect. But if there is randomization in the choice
of which jury will be determinative, and the jurors are not told, then
in effect the fate of defendants in criminal cases would be decided by
the flip of a coin, which would be unconstitutional."
There are other difficulties in comparing empirically the results of
juries of different sizes and conviction requirements. First, there is little
likelihood that actual juries of all possible sizes (from six to twelve
members) and fractional conviction requirements could be found; hence
empirical data would be limited. With only a few data points, assump-
tions can be made about the missing data, but such an analysis is a step
away from an empirical approach and begins to become a deductive
approach. Second, and more important, an empirical approach cannot
tell us how many innocent defendants are likely to be convicted by juries
of various sizes or how many guilty defendants are likely to be
released. It is the number of mistakes rather than the gross number of
8. As an alternative method of handling the different kinds of cases that twelve-
person and six-person juries are likely to decide, a group of knowledgeable lawyers could
assign conviction probabilities, or PAC's (see Table 1 and accompanying text), based
on twelve-person juries to both sets of cases for comparison purposes. More specif-
ically, one could transcribe 50 randomly selected twelve-person cases and 50 randomly
selected six-person cases. Then five lawyers could read all 100 cases or randomly allo-
cate 20 cases to each of themselves. Each lawyer could indicate a PAC for each case
if the case were to go to a twelve-person jury. If the twelve-person cases are a repre-
sentative sample, then the actual conviction percentage should be about 64 percent. If
lawyers are accurate perceivers of the probabilities, then their PAC's for the twelve-per-
son cases should average about 0.64, or whatever the actual conviction percentage was
for those cases. If the lawyers perceive the six-person cases as having an average PAC
of 0.45, this would tend to indicate that the cases going to six-person juries are those
in which a conviction is more difficult to obtain than the cases going to twelve-person
juries.
If the six-person juries actually convicted 45 percent of the defendants in those cases,
this would tend to show that six-person juries have the same propensity to convict as
twelve-person juries. If, however, the six-person juries actually convicted more than 45
percent of the defendants in those cases, this would tend to indicate that six-person juries
have that much higher a propensity to convict than twelve-person juries. Even expe-
rienced trial lawyers, however, may misestimate PAC's, as is indicated by the number
of cases going to court that should have been settled if the experienced lawyers on both
sides of the case could have agreed on the PAC and the sentence (or damages) likely
to be awarded upon conviction (or finding of liability). In some cases, of course, ex-
perienced lawyers may go to trial because they are being paid to do so, even though
they perceive that the last-offered plea bargain (or out-of-court settlement) is favorable
to their perception of the probability of success on trial. In spite of the possible defects
of this kind of empirical approach, a moderately good empirical approach plus a moder-
ately good deductive approach is better than the bad empirical approach of comparing
actual twelve-person jury results with six-person jury results.
[Vol. 1975:933
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convictions which concerns us, and this information cannot be derived
from empirical studies of actual jury behavior.9
B. Deductive Analysis
Another means of analyzing the effect of jury size and unanimity is
the deductive technique of model-building. 10 A model is simply a
formal way of expressing the rules for reasoning from premises to a
conclusion. Although these rules may be expressed in complex mathe-
9. Mock or experimental juries represent another way of measuring the effects of
jury size on verdicts. Although this approach has the advantage of making it possible
to present exactly the same case to a set of twelve-person juries and to a set of six-person
juries, the approach has the disadvantage of lacking realistic jury trial procedure, person-
nel, and variety that may affect the comparisons. In addition, it requires many ex-
pensive mock trials to detect the possibly small but important differences in the pro-
pensities of six- and twelve-person juries to convict. The experimental studies that have
been made with considerable concern for realism and number of trials are inconclusive
about the effects of jury size on conviction probabilities. See A. Singer & A. Barton,
Interim Report: Experimental Study of Decision-Making in the 12- Versus 6-Man Jury
under Unanimous Versus Non-Unanimous Decisions, May 1975 (unpublished mimeo-
graphed report available from Columbia Bureau of Applied Social Research); Davis,
Kerr, Atkin, Holt & Meek, The Decision Processes of 6- and 12-Person Mock Juries As-
aigned Unanimous and Two-Thirds Majority Rules, 32 J. PERSONAITY & SOcIAL PSY-
CHOLOoY 1, 11-12 (1975). Generalizations are difficult to make from these experi-
mental studies because none used more than a few different trials, although each trial
was presented to many twelve-person and six-person juries. Professor Davis has con-
cuded on the basis of his deductive model that six-person juries have a slightly higher
propensity to convict than twelve-person juries but that the difference is too small to
be detectable in any feasible mock jury experiment. See note 30 infra.
10. The questions concerning jury size and unanimity pose an especially appropriate
opportunity for deductive modeling to aid in prescribing policy decisions. At least four
conditions must be met for a prescriptive model to be meaningful. First, the premises
of the model concerning normative goals should be the goals that policymakers are
likely to have. Second, the assumptions about reality should be empirically validated,
or at least consistent with empirical knowledge. In any model, conclusions are drawn
from these assumptions about goals and facts. Third, these conclusions should follow
from premises in accordance with rules of logical deduction. Fourth, a deductive model
should be capable of indicating how any changes in its normative and empirical premises
affect the conclusions.
There are other important, but less essential, criteria for good deductive models. The
conclusions should have breadth in time, geography, and conditions. The conclusions
are also more useful if they explain how one might more effectively achieve given goals
(a prescriptive model) and if they show the causes of events (a descriptive model).
Thus, for example, to determine what jury size maximizes the number of guilty convicted
plus the number of innocent not convicted, we have to know something about the causal
relation between jury size and the conviction of the innocent and the guilty. An addi-
tional important goal is that the total structure of the model should be as simple and
vnderstandable as possible.
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matical terms, a model may be as simple as a syllogism: (1) smaller
juries are more likely to convict than larger juries; (2) six-person juries
are smaller than twelve-person juries; (3) therefore, six-person juries
are more likely to convict than twelve-person juries.
The problem to be solved requires answering the following question:
If 64 percent is the probability that an average defendant will be
convicted by a twelve-person jury deciding unanimously, what is the
probability that an average defendant will be convicted by (1) a six-
person jury deciding unanimously, (2) a twelve-person jury deciding by
a vote of ten out of twelve, and (3) other possible combinations? Then,
having determined the probability of convicting an average defendant,
we can proceed to determine the probability of wrongly convicting an
innocent defendant. And finally, it may be possible to determine the
jury size and the fraction required to convict that would best meet
society's goal of convicting the guilty without wrongly convicting the
innocent.
C. Preliminary Assumptions
There are three general kinds of influence on an individual juror's
decision. He or she may be affected (1) by the case itself: the
evidence, its presentation, and the judge's instructions; (2) by forces
unique to the individual juror: biases, history, mood, health, and
other factors; or (3) by the interaction with other jurors. We hope that
the juror is principally influenced by the case itself, and as the evidence
considered below indicates, this is in fact probably the principal influ-
ence. To the extent that jurors make up their minds solely on the basis
of the case presented to them and the judge's instructions, it is clear that
the size of the jury, or the proportion of jurors required for a verdict of
guilty, will have no effect on the average verdict; the outcome is deter-
mined by the merits of the case, and not by the jury acting arbitrarily.
However desirable such a state of affairs might be, we know the
merits of the case are not the sole determining factor, or at least that
jurors are affected differently by the case presented to them. In addi-
tion to the forces applied by prosecution, defense, and court, which act
from outside the jury, there are forces acting within the jury and within
the jurors themselves. We know that such forces exist because juries
are not always unanimous.
If the size of a jury makes any difference then, it must be because of
these internal forces. Of the two kinds of internal forces-those within
[Vol. 1975:933
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the jury and those within the juror-the independent reaction of the
juror is the more amenable to analysis because of the very independence
of such reactions. If jurors respond to the case presented in ways that
cannot be predicted from the nature of the case itself, or from the votes
of the other jurors, their behavior is just the kind that mathematical
statistics and probability theory are designed to handle. Twelve truly
independent jurors behave like twelve coins, and there are excellent and
simple means of predicting the result of flipping large numbers of coins.
A juror who tends to vote for conviction, regardless of the case present-
ed to him or the reactions of fellow jurors, would be analogous to a coin
that is very heavily weighted on one side. In the usual language of
statistics, we say that an ordinary coin has a 50 percent, or 0.50,
probability of landing heads up; a juror voting independently might
have a 96.4 percent, or 0.964, probability of voting for conviction. If
all jurors acted in this fashion, a twelve-person jury would convict
defendants about 64 percent of the time, which is 0.964 multiplied by
itself twelve times. The smaller the jury, the higher the probability of
conviction would be." Thus, to the extent that jurors behave like coins,
jury size, or the proportion needed to convict, will clearly have an
important effect on the likelihood that a defendant will be convicted. In
reality, such independent decisions account for only a small proportion
of jury behavior, no more than about eleven percent, as we shall see.
Nevertheless, the extent to which jury behavior is analogous to flipping
twelve or six coins may determine the differences between large and
small juries and between unanimous and nonunanimous voting.
The second kind of internal jury force, the behavior of the other
jurors, is much more difficult to analyze or predict. For instance, we
know that in some cases a single juror or a minority of the jury will sway
the majority to its position. It may be, however, that the jury usually
acts as a kind of averaging machine, converting a majority view into a
unanimous verdict. Since there are occasionally hung juries and in-
stances of minorities persuading the majorities, we know that this aver-
aging machine effect does not happen all the time. Nevertheless, as we
shall see later, juries actually do convert the majority's view to a unani-
mous one in most cases, and to this extent, juries act as averaging
machines, responding as units to the case presented. Just as we ob-
served when the jurors are directly influenced by the case, the size of the
11. For example, the probability that a six-person jury would convict an average de-
fendant would then be (0.964)6 = 0.80 = 80 percent.
Vol. 1975:933]
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jury would again be unimportant, and we could construct our model of
jury behavior by saying that regardless of size, the average jury convicts
64 percent of the time if it contains average jurors.
It may be, therefore, that although the juror's independent reactions,
in other words, his idiosyncrasies, are not very important-at least
relative to the averaging perspective-in determining the overall number
of convictions, these independent reactions may nonetheless be decisive
in answering our questions about the effects of jury size and unanimity.
This observation should not be surprising, since we are concerned
primarily with the mistakes that different-sized juries may make, and the
subjective characteristics of the jurors will certainly play a large role in
whatever mistakes are made.
To define more precisely the effects of the jurors' independent behav-
ior, we can construct a simple model that considers this coin-flipping
aspect of juror behavior alone. Once this model has been constructed,
it can be modified to allow mathematical expression of the impact that
outside forces-the attorneys, the court, the evidence-have on the jury
as a whole. This modified expression will also represent the interac-
tions among the jurors to the extent that a jury acts as an averaging
machine, the function of which is unaffected by its size. We will return
to the validity of these assumptions at the close of the discussion.
II. BAsIc DATA AND ASSUMPTIONS
In their University of Chicago Jury Project, Professors Kalven and
Zeisel found that twelve-person unanimous juries convict 64 percent of
the defendants brought before them.12  This finding will be our refer-
ence point for constructing a jury model reflecting the independent juror
behavior that is analogous to coins being flipped.
A. The Probability of Convicting an Average Defendant
Before proceeding further, it will be helpful to have a set of simple
symbols. We will use NJ to refer to the number of jurors on a jury and
NC to refer to the number of jurors needed to convict. The symbol
PAC, with capital letters, will be used to refer to the probability of an
average defendant being convicted by an average jury, and the symbol
pac, with small letters, to refer to the probability of an average defend-
ant receiving a conviction vote from an average juror.18 The symbol
12. See note 5 supra and accompanying text.
13. We will frequently add a subscript to the probability symbols to indicate the size
[Vol. 1975:933
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PAN refers to the probability of an average defendant not being convict-
ed by an average jury, and the symbol pan refers to the probability of an
average defendant receiving a nonconviction vote from an average
juror. PAC is thus the complement of PAN, since both must add up to
1.0, and pac is the complement of pan. Applying the Kalven and
Zeisel data, PAC = 0.64 and PAN = 0.36. If we assume that jurors
act as if they were coins being flipped, what would be the value of pac
and pan? In other words, how are the coins weighted?
We know that to get a conviction, all twelve coins must come up
"convict." The probability of flipping twelve ordinary coins and having
them all come up heads is calculated by taking 0.5, the probability of a
head on any one flip, and multiplying it by itself twelve times, which is
expressed as (0.5)1-. In general, if the flips are independent of each
other, the probability of a head, or a "favorable" outcome, raised to the
nth power (where n is the number of consecutive flips) gives the
probability that the flips will be "unanimous." If we were dealing with
a jury, this general rule could be stated as a formula, PAC - (pac) .
Using the analogy of an ordinary coin, pac would be 0.5, NJ would be
12, and PAC, the probability of conviction, would be only 0.0002.
From Kalven and Zeisers data, however, we already know that PAC
- 0.64, and thus the problem becomes one of solving for pac in the
equation 0.64 = (pac)12. Raising both sides of the equation to the
1/12th power changes the equation to pac = (0.64)1/12 or pac =
(0.64)0.08, and pac = 0.964. In other words, if the average juror
behaves as if he were a coin being flipped, the coin would be a heavily
weighted one, since there is a 0.964 probability of the juror's voting for
conviction. The complement of this probability, 0.036, would then
represent the probability of a juror voting against conviction.
of the jury or the fraction required to convict. Thus, PAC.2/i or simply PAC12
refers to the probability of an average defendant being convicted by a twelve-person jury.
The symbol PACNj refers to the probability of an average person being convicted by
a jury of NJ size or with N jurors. Similarly, PAC1 1 /1 2 refers to the probability of
an average defendant being convicted with a twelve-person jury when only eleven jurors
are needed to convict (i.e. the fraction required to convict is 11/12). The symbol
PACNJ.1/NJ refers to the probability of an average defendant being convicted with a
jury of NJ size when one less than NJ is needed to convict. PAC without any subscript
generally refers to the probability of an average person being convicted given varying
jury sizes and varying fractions required to convict. The particular context, however,
may indicate that the unsubscripted probability refers to an NJ of twelve operating under
a unanimity rule.
Vol. 1975:933]
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B. The Probability of Convicting an Innocent or Guilty Defendant
These are the values of PAC, PAN, pac, and pan that we would
predict if jurors voted quite independently in an average case. We
suspect, however, that a truly innocent 14 defendant would be less likely
to be convicted than an average defendant. Thus, if 64 percent of all
defendants are convicted, the proportion of truly innocent defendants
convicted would be smaller than 64 percent. But because truly inno-
cent defendants will not usually be brought to trial unless they appear to
be guilty, the probability of their being convicted may not be very far
below the average of 64 percent. We will say, for the sake of discus-
sion, that 40 percent of innocent defendants are convicted, although we
will experiment later with other conviction probabilities.
A truly guilty defendant, on the other hand, would probably be more
likely to be convicted than an average defendant. If most defendants
are actually guilty, the probability of convicting the truly guilty defend-
ant would not be much higher than the probability of convicting the
average defendant. Seventy percent can be used for the sake of discus-
sion, although again, we can later experiment with other conviction
probabilities.
We can represent the probability that a truly innocent defendant will
be convicted by an average jury as PIC and its complement, the proba-
bility that an innocent defendant will not be convicted, as PIN. PGC
represents the probability that a truly guilty defendant will be convicted
by an average jury, and PGN is the complement. Our assumptions can
be expressed in terms of these new symbols: PIC = 0.40, PIN = 0.60,
PGC - 0.70, and PGN = 0.30.
The probability that an average juror will vote to convict an innocent
defendant and the probability that an average juror will vote to convict a
guilty defendant can be determined as we determined pac, by solving for
pie in the equation PIC = (pic)N or 0.40 = (pic)12, and solving for
pgc in the equation PGC = (pgc)NJ or 0.70 = (pgc)' 2. Doing so
yields a pic of (0.40)0.088 or 0.926, and a pgc of (0.70)0.083 or 0.971.
These numbers are a prediction that the average juror votes for convic-
tion more than 90 percent of the time. We know that this is not the
case, however, because Kalven and Zeisel's data show that about 30
14. Throughout this discussion we will assume that innocence and guilt are factual
matters, that is, that a defendant may actually be "guilty" although mistakenly acquitted
by a jury.
[Vol. 1975:933
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percent of all juries are unanimous for acquittal. The prediction that
jurors vote for acquittal less than ten percent of the time stems from the
temporary assumption, for the sake of calculation, that only the juror's
independent behavior is important. This assumption will be modified
later.
C. The Proportion of Innocent and Guilty Defendants
We now must make some assumptions about the proportion of inno-
cent and guilty defendants among the total number of criminal defend-
ants whose cases are submitted to American juries. It seems reasonable
to assume that truly innocent defendants account for only a small
percentage. Yet this percentage is not likely to be zero since 30.3
percent of defendants are unanimously acquitted, and 5.5 percent of the
juries can reach no verdict. 15 The requirement of finding a defendant
guilty "beyond a reasonable doubt" can be interpreted 16 as meaning that
the evidence should weigh against a defendant at about a 0.95 probabili-
ty level before that defendant can be convicted.lT Let us, therefore,
temporarily assume that about 95 percent of the defendants tried by
juries are in fact guilty and about 5 percent are innocent. For these five
percent, there is, according to our previous assumptions, a 40-percent
chance of conviction. To facilitate calculation, the proportion of inno-
15. See note 5 supra and accompanying text.
16. See Simon & Mahan, Quantifying Burdens of Proof, 5 LAw & Soc'Y REv. 319
(1971).
17. The 0.95 probability level is customarily used in social science to determine
whether an hypothesis has been confirmed; in discussing that level, statisticians some-
times analogize to criminal case decision-making. E.g., T. WONNACOTr & R. WONNA-
COTT, INTRODUCTORY STATISTICS 167, 171-74 (1972). The Blackstone Standard, which
would allow ten guilty people to go free to save one innocent person from conviction,
see note 18 infra and accompanying text, can be translated into a probability of 10/11
or 0.91. Thus, the probability of a defendant's guilt would have to exceed 0.91 before
the defendant could be convicted. See generally Kaplan, Decision Theory and the Fact-
finding Process, 20 STAN. L. REv. 1065, 1071-77 (1968).
The 0.95 probability level is equivalent to a 0.05 probability that a given result was
due to chance. The judicial system, perhaps without realizing it, has sometimes applied
this 0.05 level of statistical significance in contexts other than "beyond a reasonable
doubt." See, e.g., Ulmer, Supreme Court Behavior in Racial Exclusion Cases: 1935-
1960, 56 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 325 (1962). Ulmer pointed out that the Supreme Court
was consistently finding racial discrimination in jury selection when, given the percent-
age of blacks in the population, there was less than a 0.05 probability that a jury panel
randomly selected would have consisted of as few blacks as were actually present on
the panel. When the probability was greater than 0.05, however, the Court consistently
found no racial discrimination.
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cent and guilty defendants will be expressed as 50 and 950, as if there
were only 1000 defendants in all, and these two numbers will be
represented by the symbols #I and #G.
D. Summary of the Coin-Flipping Model
The symbols, data, and assumptions of the model we have construct-
ed, the formulas for using these data and assumptions to predict juror
and jury behavior, and the results of our predictions, are summarized in
Table 1. The reader is reminded, once again, that the numerical
predictions will be modified by other factors known to be operating on
juries. The coin-flipping model is used simply to examine one aspect of
juror behavior in isolation. A rough check on the model's internal
consistency can be made by operating it in reverse, that is, by trying to
predict, from the conclusions we have derived, the actual number of
convictions brought by an average jury-which is the fact with which
we began, PAC- 0.64. The model gives PGC (#G) + PIC (#I) =
PAC = 685/1000 = 0.685, reasonably close to our starting point.
TABLE 1. SUMMARY OF THE COIN-FLIPPING MODEL OF A
TWELVE-PERSON UNANIMOUS JURY
TYPE OF TYPE OF CONVICTION NON-CONVICTION
DEFENDANT DECISION-MAKER PROBABILITY (C) PROBABILITY (N)
Innocent (I) Jury PIC = 0.40* PIN = 0.60
Innocent (i) Juror pic = 0.926** pin = 0.074
Guilty (G) Jury PGC = 0.70* PGN = 0.30
Guilty (g) Juror pgc = 0.971 pgn = 0.029
Basic formulas:
pic = (0.40)1/12; pgc = (0.70)1/12; PIC = picNl; PGC = pgcNJ
PIC + PIN = PGC + PGN = 1.0
pic + pin = pgc + pgn = 1.0
Number of jurors = NJ = 12
#G = 950 guilty defendants per 1000 defendants
#I = 50 innocent defendants per 1000 defendants (#I = 1000 - #G).
* Assumed values.
** Jury probabilities are given to two decimal places, and the juror probabilities are
given to three decimal places.
III. OPTIMIZING JURY SIZE AND FRACTION
REQUIRED FOR CONVICTION
A. Effects of Changes in Jury Size on Jury Errors
This simple model reflecting a juror's independent behavior can now
be used to explore the effects of jury size. In particular, what changes
[Vol. 1975:933
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in the jury's overall error rate will result from changes in the size of the
jury? We can explore this question quite simply by substituting various
numbers other than twelve for NJ in the expressions given in Table 1,
and then recalculating all of the model's predictions, while holding other
assumptions constant. The results of such calculations for a wide range
of jury sizes are presented in Table 2.
TABLE 2. UNANIMOUS CONVICTION PROBABILITIES AND NUMBERS
OF ERRORS FOR VARIOUS JURY SIZES WITH 1000 DEFENDANTS
(Independent Probability Submodel)
Prob. Number Prob. Prob. Number Unwtd. Weighted
Jury Size Innocent Innocent Guilty Guilty Guilty Sum of Sum of
(NJ) Cony. Cony. Cony. Not Conv. Not Conv. Errors Errors
(PIC) (#IC) (PGC) (PGN) (#GN) (USE) (WSE)
15 .32 16 .64 .36 339 355 497
14 .34 17 .66 .34 321 338 491
13 .37 18 .68 .32 302 320 486
12 .40 20 .70 .30 283 302 481
11 .43 22 .72 .28 263 281 477
10 .46 23 .74 .26 242 265 474
9 .50 25 .77 .23 221 246 471
8 .54 27 .79 .21 199 226 470
*7 .58 29 .81 .19 177 206 468*
6 .63 32 .84 .16 154 185 469
5 .68 34 .86 .14 130 164 470
4 .74 37 .89 .11 106 142 473
3 .79 40 .92 .08 80 120 477
2 .86 43 .94 .06 54 97 483
1 .93 46 .97 .03 28 74 491
Formulas for the columns (discrepancies are due to rounding):
PIC = (0.926)NJ. #IC = (PIC)(50). PGC = (0.971)NJ.
PGN = 1.0 - PGC. #GN = (PGN)(950).
USE = #IC + #GN. WSE = 10(#IC) + (#GN).
* NJ where WSE is minimized (i.e. NJo*, the optimum NJ with 0 dissents).
Column 7 of the table shows the sum of the two kinds of errors that a
jury is capable of making: the number of innocent defendants that the
jury convicts plus the number of guilty defendants that it fails to convict.
These are the errors we are most concerned to minimize. Column 8
shows a weighted sum of errors. We give the two kinds of errors
different weights because we assume that society does so. According to
Blackstone's well-known statement of this view, "It is better that ten
guilty persons escape than that one innocent suffer."18 Having regard
for the great influence of Blackstone on the authors of the Constitu-
18. 4 W. BLACESTONm, CoMmNTARIEs *358.
945
Washington University Open Scholarship
946 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 1975:933
tion,19 we will also use a trade-off weight of ten, multiplying the number
of innocent defendants wrongly convicted by ten before adding it to the
number of guilty defendants who escape conviction, to obtain a weight-
ed sum of all jury errors.20
The table shows that as the jury size decreases, the probability of
convicting either an innocent or a guilty defendant increases. This
result is directly attributable to the prediction, based on our coin-
flipping model, that individual jurors vote for conviction more than 90
percent of the time, regardless of the guilt or innocence of the defend-
ant. When jury size is reduced, unanimity becomes easier to obtain,
causing the risk of wrongful conviction to increase while the risk of
failing to convict a guilty defendant decreases. Therefore, the sum of
the two kinds of errors, appropriately weighted, first declines and then
rises, as shown in Figure 1.
B. The Optimum Jury Size
The most important aspect of Table 2 and Figure 1 is the point at
which the weighted sum of errors is least. This point is reached at a
jury size somewhere between six and eight; the nearest whole number is
seven. 2 The model therefore predicts that a jury of seven members will
19. For discussion of Blackstone's influence on the founding fathers, see F.
AUMANN, THE CHANGING AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM 30 (1940); FREDERICK WILLIAM
MAITAND READER 129-30 (V. Delany ed. 1957); R. POUND, THE FORMATIVE ERA O1'
AMEmCAN LAW 8-9 (1938).
20. By providing a trade-off weight between errors of convicting the innocent and
errors of not convicting the guilty, we avoid the extremely difficult problem of trying
to express how much each of those kinds of errors are worth in a common unit of meas-
urement like dollars. In other words, we are only concerned with the relative value of
disutility of the kinds of errors, not their absolute value.
21. The minimum value for the weighted-error function can be calculated directly,
of course, without reference to the table. If WSE = 10(#IC) + (#GN), then by
substituting values for #IC and #GN and simplifying, we have
WSE = 10(0.926)NJ(50) + [1.0 - (0.971)NJ](950)
= 500(0.926)NJT + 950 - 950(0.971)N.
Given that relation between WSE and NJ, we can say that the slope of WSE with re-
spect to NJ at any point on the WSE curve equals
500(0.926)NJ(LN 0.926) + 0 - 950(0.971)NJ(LN 0.971),
where LN X means the natural logarithm of X (the logarithm to the base e). This
slope of WSE to NJ follows from the rule that if Y = bx, then the slope of Y to X
is (bx) (LN b), and from the rule that if Y is a constant, then the slope of Y to X
is zero. To solve for NJ, we set that slope expression equal to zero. We then have
one equation with one unknown, which we can solve by the rules for dealing with ex-
ponents encountered by most attorneys in high school algebra. Doing so reveals that
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the optimum NJ, where the slope of WSE reaches its lowest point, is NJ = 6.7, or 7
if we round to the nearest integer.
For further detail on what is involved in finding the bottom point on a valley-shaped
total cost curve or the top point on a hill-shaped total benefit curve, see W. BAUMOL,
ECONOMIC THEORY AND OPERATIONS ANALYsIs 1-69 (1965); M. BRENNAN, PREFACE TO
ECONOMETRICS 1-192 (1973); S. NAGEL, P. WiCE & M. NEEF, THE POLICY PROBLEM
op DOING Too LIrrLE oR Too Mucn: PRE-TRAL RELEASE AS A CASE IN PoINT (Sage
Professional Papers in Administrative & Policy Studies No. 03-037 1976); S. RIcHMoND,
OPERATIONS RESEARCH FOR MANAGEMENT DECISIONS 6-10, 57-58, 87-88 (1968). These
references also discuss the rules for finding the slope of exponential functions similar
to those which are involved in the jury optimization problem. For a more general dis-
cession of the jury size optimization problem, including the general equation for finding
NM*, see note 31 infra and accompanying text.
Weighted Sum of Errors (WSE)
of Innocent Convicted
(10 #IC)
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minimize errors in the fashion we assume would be optimum. Subject to
the limitations on the coin-flipping model noted above, we can refer to a
seven-member jury as the optimum jury size for unanimous juries. This
prediction will be of importance when we consider a more complete
model of the jury.
C. Optimizing the Fraction Required to Convict
Table 3 shows the probabilities that guilty or innocent defendants will
be convicted by juries of varying sizes operating under rules requiring
either unanimity or the indicated fraction for conviction. The table is
constructed in a manner similar to Table 2, except for the calculation of
the probabilities of conviction (PIC and PGC) when divided juries are
permitted. In such cases, several possible outcomes will lead to convic-
tion, and the probability of each must be calculated and the results
added together. This is slightly more difficult to do than would first
appear. We can easily calculate the probability of all the jurors in any
given jury arriving at the same decision, but the probability that at least
eleven out of the twelve will agree is more complex, because any one of
the twelve jurors may disagree without affecting the outcome. If we
continue to assume that all the jurors are acting independently of each
other, however, then there are well-known mathematical formulas that
will yield such probabilities. 22 If the jurors are completely independent
22. The binomial probability formula for the probability of exactly R favorable,
successful, or designated outcomes out of N attempts is
N!(P)E(Q)N-R
R! (N-R)!I
where P is the probability of a successful outcome on one attempt or trial and Q is the
complement of P. To determine the probability of at least R successful outcomes out
of N attempts, one must sum the probabilities of exactly N out of N, N-1 out of N,
N-2 out of N, down to and including R out of N. If we assume the coin is evenly bal-
anced so that the probability of a head on one flip is 0.5, and if we use the binomial
probability formula to calculate the probability of eleven flips coming up heads out of
twelve coin flips, the expression is
12!(0.5)11(0.5) 12-11
P -
11!(12-11)!
If we carry out the arithmetic, we find that the probability for exactly eleven heads out
of twelve coin flips is 12(0.5)11(0.5) = 0.002928. Since twelve out of twelve heads
has an exact probability of (0.5)12 or 0.000244, the probability of at least eleven heads
out of twelve flips is 0.002928 plus 0.000244, or 0.003172.
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of each other, the final vote tallies will be arranged in a skewed Poisson
distribution, and tables giving such distributions are in many standard
statistical reference works.23
A factor of ten is again used in Table 3 to weight the number of
errors resulting in wrongful convictions, and the weighted sum of errors
again shows a decline as jury size decreases. The probability of convict-
ing any defendant increases when either the size of the jury or the
number required for conviction is reduced, as we would expect, and the
probability of failing to convict a guilty defendant decreases under the
same conditions. Curves, similar to those shown in Figure 1, could be
plotted to compare these effects and the weighted sums of errors would
If our coin is not evenly balanced, but instead has a probability of coming up heads-
or conviction of an innocent defendant-of 0.926, then the probability of exactly eleven
out of twelve proconviction votes would be
12!(0.926)11(0.074) 12-11
PIC = = 12(0.926)11(0.074) = 0.38.
The 0.074 in the equation is pin, the complement of pic, from Table 1. Because we
began with the assumption that the probability of twelve out of twelve jurors voting to
convict an innocent defendant was 0.40, the probability of at least eleven conviction
votes out of twelve jurors is 0.38 plus 0.40, or the 0.78 that is shown on row 5 of Table
3. Similarly, the probability of exactly eleven out of twelve jurors voting to convict a
guilty defendant would be
121(0.971)11 (0.029) 12-11
PGC = = 12(0.971)11(0.029) = 0.25.11!(12-11)!
Adding 0.25 and 0.70, the probability that twelve out of twelve jurors will convict a
guilty defendant, we get a cumulative or "at least" probability of the 0.95 shown in Table
3.
We could follow this procedure to calculate all the PIC's and PGC's in columns 2
and 4. Doing so, however, would be rather laborious. To save time, a binomial prob-
ability table might be consulted, although no published binomial probability table that
has been found included single juror probabilities like 0.074 and 0.029. The smallest
single-flip probabilities given were 0.05.
For further detail on binomial probability and related probability matters, see H. BLA-
LOCE, SOCIAL STAnTISTCS (1972); M. BRENNAN, supra note 21; J. KEMENY, J. SNELL &
G. THOMPSON, INTRODUCTION TO FINrrE MATHEMATICS 113-77, 148 (1957); S. RICH-
MoND, supra note 21, at 127-78, 162.
23. The mathematical table used in preparing Table 3 is that given in S. RIcHMoND,
supra note 21, at 973-76. To use the table, we must compare (pin) (NJ) or 0.074(NJ)
with the Poisson table, read off the probabilities corresponding to various numbers of
nonconviction votes, and add those probabilities to get the PIC's. We then compare
(pgn) (NJ) or 0.029(NJ) to the Poisson table in a similar manner to get the PGC's.
Some interpolation within the table may be needed. The more precise binomial prob-
ability formula was used to calculate the probabilities for the various fractions required
to convict in the vicinity of the critical region where the weighted sum of errors reaches
a minimum.
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TABLE 3. CONVICTION PROBABILITIES AND NUMBER OF ERRORS
FOR VARIOUS FRACTIONS REQUIRED TO CONVICT
(Independent Probability Submodel)
Fraction
Required
to
Convict
(NC/NJ)
12/12
10/10
8/8
6/6
*11/12
9/10
7/8
**10/12
5/6
8/10
9/12
6/8
7/10
8/12
4/6
5/8
6/10
7/12
Prob.
Innocent
Conv.
(PIC)
.40
.46
.54
.63
.78
.83
.89
.92
.93
.94
.97
.98
.98
.99
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
Number
Innocent
Conv.
(#iC)
20
23
27
32
39
42
44
46
46
47
48
49
49
50
50
50
50
50
Prob.
Guilty
Conv.
(PGC)
.70
.74
.79
.84
.95
.96
.97
.98
.98
.98
.99
.99
.99
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
Prob.
Guilty
Not Cony.
(PGN)
.30
.26
.21
.16
.05
.04
.03
.02
.02
.02
.01
.01
.01
0
0
0
0
0
Number
Guilty
Not Cony.
(#GN)
283
242
199
154
48
38
28
19
19
19
10
10
10
0
0
0
0
0
Unwtd.
Sum of
Errors
(USE)
302
265
226
185
87
80
72
63
65
66
58
59
59
50
50
50
50
50
Weighted
Sum of
Errors
(WSE)
481
474
470
469
438*
453
474
479**
484
489
494
500
500
495
500
500
500
500
Formulas for the columns (discrepancies are due to rounding):
PIC and PGC are determined by use of a Poisson probability table (see text).
#IC = (PIC)(50). PGN = 1.0 - PGC. #GN = (PGN) (950).
USE = IC + #GN. WSE = 10(#IC) + (#GN).
* Value of NJ where WSE is minimized with one dissent allowed (i.e. NJ1).
** NJ where WSE is minimized with two dissents allowed (i.e. NJ2).
show the same rise and fall, but nothing of impohtance would be added
to the qualitative conclusions already noted. Minimum values in the
table are noted by asterisks; among the combinations considered, 4 these
would be optimum values.
IV. COMPLETING TIM MODEL
A. Combining the Independent-and Collective-Mind Perspectives
The model of independent juror decisions has now been developed in
some detail, and it is possible to include additional considerations. At
the outset, we noted the three determinants of any juror's decision: the
case presented to him, the influence of other jurors, and the factors
24. To keep the table within reasonable bounds, only a few possible jury sizes
and conviction fractions have been used. It is unlikely that juries larger than twelve
or smaller than six will be used in the near future, however, and the table gives most
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unique to that juror. This last factor, the juror's idiosyncrasy, or inde-
pendence, is represented in the model we have constructed. The re-
maining task is to determine the extent to which this coin-flipping form
of behavior determines jury decisions as a whole and to find means
of expressing the effects of the other two influences.
It is not difficult to formulate a simple expression to describe the
influence that acts equally and to the same effect on every juror. Each
juror would vote as all the others did, and our model becomes one of
simple identity: PAC = pac, PIC = pic, and PGC = pgc. If this
were in fact true, as it would be if jurors always made decisions based
solely on the merits of the case presented, there would be no hung juries,
but only unanimous votes for acquittal or conviction. Jury size would
be irrelevant. This identity model is clearly not the reality of jury
function, but we can determine the extent to which it reflects juror
behavior.
Since both independent probability and the collective effects of the
case are influences on each juror, we can compare the two and deter-
mine their relative importance. This can be done if we assume, for the
moment, that only these two influences act on each juror and then
modify our independent probability model to incorporate the uniform
effects of the case presented to the collective jurors. The simplest and
most direct way of combining these two influences is simply to average
them, although there is nothing in what we know about the true
situation that dictates this form of expression.
The two models will be distinguished, for convenience, by calling
them the "independent-mind" and "collective-mind" models. The latter
is simply an identity, PAC - pac. Returning to the Kalven and Zeisel
data, we know that the average proportion of convictions is 0.64 =
PAC. The "independent-mind" formula is PAC = pac"i. A simple
average of the two PAC's would be PAC = 1/2(paNJ + 0.64) or
1/ 2 (0. 9 64 NJ + 0.64). Similarly, we would estimate combination PIC
- 1/2(picNJ + 0.40) or 1/2(0.926 + 0.40) and the combination
PGC = 1/2(pgcN J + 0.70) or 1/ 2 (0. 971NJ + 0.70).
There is no particular reason to suppose that the two models have
equal weights in influencing jury behavior, however, and so we should
determine a weighted average instead of a simple average. But what
weighting factor is correct? The answer is not difficult to determine.
The Kalven and Zeisel data supply us with the total number of juror
values between these two extremes, provided that at least a majority will always be re-
quired for conviction.
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votes for conviction or acquittal, including that which resulted in hung
juries rather than convictions: 67.7 percent of all individual juror's votes
were for conviction and 32.3 percent were for acquittal. These figures
reflect the following empirical facts: 64.2 percent of all juries voted
unanimously for conviction; an average of 7.5 votes were for conviction
and 4.5 for acquittal on the 5.5 percent of all juries that could reach no
decision; and the remaining 30.3 percent of juries voted unanimously
for acquittal.25 We can view the 67.7 percent votes for conviction as an
empirically determined pac rather than one determined from either
separate model. If the individual juror's propensity to convict is deter-
mined by the combination of the two models that we have discussed,
then pac must be equal to the weighted average of the independent-
mind and collective-mind values for pac.
In the case of a twelve-person unanimous jury, this can be expressed
as
empirical pac12 = (WE(O.64) 1/ 12 + 0.640)
WE+I
since 0.641/12 (or 0.964) and 0.640 were the values assigned to pac in
the two different models. If we set pac2 in this equation equal to
0.677, our "empirical" pac, and solve for WE, we will determine the
correct weighting factor for averaging the two values of pac, or for
combining the two models. WE, in short, is the factor we can use to
combine the two separate and incomplete models in such a way that
together they will be in agreement with the observed probability that an
average juror will vote to convict an average defendant 67.7 percent of
the time. Solving the above equation for WE, we find WE to be equal
to 0.13. Thus, while the weight of the collective-mind model is 1.00,
the weight of the independent model is only 0.13, for a total weight of
1.13. This means that the independent-mind, coin-flipping model we
have developed accounts for about eleven percent of the total (i.e.
0.13/1.13), or that the independent probability propensities of jurors
account for about eleven percent of jury behavior.26
25. See KALvEN & ZFsEL 460.
26. When we say that jury decisionmaking is about eleven percent in conformity
with the independent probability model and 89 percent in conformity with the collective
mind model, we are not saying that eleven percent of the jurors on an average jury fol-
low the independent probability model and 89 percent follow the collective mind model.
Rather, we are saying that jurors (like human beings in most group decision situations)
simultaneously manifest some degree of independence and some degree of willingness to
go along with the average person in the group. The average juror thus has about an
[Vol. 1975:933
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A single dissident juror may be more able to maintain his position
against the smaller number of antagonists in a six-person jury; yet he
may find more allies on a twelve-person jury. Some people, in some
circumstances, may be capable of swaying an opposing majority; others
may not. There is no way of predicting all such interactions in advance,
and to this extent, no model can completely predict the effects of
changing jury size or unanimity requirements in a specific case, as
opposed to an average case or a class or category of cases.
In by far the majority of cases, the ultimate verdict is the one favored
by a majority of the jury from the outset; juries that are unable to come
to agreement because of a single holdout are extremely rare. 7 In most
instances, a jury behaves like an averaging machine, converting a major-
ity vote into a unanimous vote. Although there are certainly interac-
tions among the jury, the effect of the interactions is simply to amplify
the key outside influence, namely the case and instructions presented to
the jurors. With any given jury, therefore, this kind of common stimuli
and interaction is the collective-mind behavior already discussed. Ju-
rors in most cases would vote unanimously, and the residue of hung
juries would be attributed in part to the independent-mind effects and in
part to other unpredictable interactions idiosyncratic to specific cases,
juries, or jurors.
The averaging-machine interactions may have a very large effect on
jury outcomes; only 30 percent of verdicts are brought without delibera-
tion, and in only three percent does deliberation result in a minority
persuading the majority.28 In about two-thirds of all cases, the majority
view prevails through deliberation. Unfortunately, we know very little
about this process or how it might be affected by changes in jury size.
Will minorities be more or less resistant to persuasion in smaller juries?
Will lone dissidents find allies in large juries, or will they be emboldened
in small ones? These unpredictable factors seem to balance out with a
eleven percent independence orientation and an 89 percent collective-mind orientation.
Similarly, the average jury composed of twelve average jurors also has an eleven percent
independence orientation in its decisionmaking.
27. See KALvEN & ZEISEL 460.
28. The data for comparing first-ballot votes with final-ballot votes is given in KA.-
vEN & ZEISEL 491. From a sample of 225 cases, the minority on the first ballot won
out on the final ballot in only six cases. In 69 of the 225 cases, the first ballot produced
a unanimous decision. In 13 of the cases, the jury was unable to reach a unanimous
decision. In the remaining 137 cases, the initial majority won out on the final ballot
(i.e. the position of the initial majority became the unanimous position).
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twelve-person unanimous jury and do not have a large effect on overall
conviction rates, as we have seen. But would they result in unbalanced
changes in these rates if jury size or the requirement of unanimity were
changed? We simply do not know, although the infrequency of hung
juries prompts us to assume that the averaging machine is a powerful
one, operating effectively in most circumstances. Only 5.5 percent of
verdicts are indeterminate, and only three percent of verdicts are the
result of a minority persuading a majority."' We can only assume that
an averaging machine this effective will continue to operate under
altered circumstances. In other words, we assume that the relative
weights of 0.13 and 1.00 for the independent probability model and the
collective-mind model will roughly prevail for different jury sizes.
Because the weighted average of the two models seeks to incorporate
all three influences on the juror, the combination model is thus a
reasonably complete model of jury behavior. To complete this model
numerically, we need only make some modest alterations in the inde-
pendent-mind model already developed to accommodate the weighting
factor for combining the independent-mind model with the collective-
mind model. Of the influences we are considering, only the independ-
ent-mind factor (and representativeness of sample size variations) call
for any altered result in juries of different sizes. It is, therefore, not
surprising that the independent-mind model determines the effects of
altering jury size or unanimity rules. The magnitude of such changes,
however, will be small, in accord with the low weighting factor of 0.13
already calculated.3 0
29. See KALVEN & ZEISEL 460.
30. An overemphasis on the independent probability perspective is the main defect
in the previous mathematical models that have attempted to relate jury size to conviction
probabilities. E.g., Friedman, Trial by Jury: Criteria for Convictions, Jury Size, and
Type I and Type 2 Errors, 26 AM. STATiSTiCiAN, April, 1972, at 21-23; Note, The Effect
of Jury Size on the Probability of Conviction: An Evaluation of Williams v. Florida,
22 CASE W. Ran. L. Rnv. 529 (1971).
The student author assumes that the majority viewpoint on the jury becomes the win-
ning viewpoint, which is nearly always true. To compare the probability of a six-person
jury convicting a defendant with that of a twelve-person jury convicting a defendant, the
author calculates these probabilities, using a multiplicative model, for various fractions
of jurors inclined to consider a defendant guilty prior to deliberations. Id. at 540-47.
His assumption that the majority always wins makes it impossible to test the effects of
reducing the fraction required to convict. Data is also unavailable on predeliberation
propensities as contrasted to propensities manifesting themselves on the initial or final
ballot. The author's model seems to run contrary to justifiable common sense in saying
that there will be more acquittals with a six-person jury than with a twelve-person jury
wheL the fraction of jurors inclined to convict is greater than 0.5. Id. at 547. Part
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B. Revised Data and Results
1. Jury Size
Table 4 is a revised version of Table 2 and shows conviction probabil-
ities and numbers of errors for various jury sizes, calculated by using the
completed combination model. The method for calculating #IC,
of the problem is his failure to consider hung juries (which occur more often with
twelve-person juries) as being closer to acquittals than convictions. In addition, the
model provides no way of reconciling the Kalven-Zeisel data, which show that juries con-
vict 64 percent of the time and that jurors vote to convict 67.7 percent of the time.
Friedman's model involves jury outcomes (i.e. PAC's) as a function, not of juror pro-
pensities, but rather of the defendant's appearance of guilt (the X variable). His model
is also a purely multiplicative one in that for a twelve-person unanimous jury,
PAC = X12, and for a six-person unanimous jury PAC = X6, but the model is capable
of considering a reduction in the fraction required to convict (as well as the jury size)
by not making any assumptions about the majority winning. The X variable in Fried-
man's model, however, is even more difficult to verify empirically than the predelibera-
tion propensity variable of the model above. Neither model seeks to come to grips with
the problems involved in determining an optimum jury size.
Mathematicians such as Laplace, Condorcet, Poisson, and Cournot have also used jury
decisionmaking to illustrate mathematical rules of independent probability, but without
seeking to determine the extent to which the independent probability model actually fits
jury decisionmaking. Some of the relevant work of Laplace and Condorcet is discussed
in Ulmer, Quantitative Analysis of Judicial Decisions, 28 LAw AND CONTEMP. PRoB. 164
(1963).
For more recent deductive jury-size models, see B. Grofman, Not Necessarily Twelve
and Not Necessarily Unanimous: Conviction, Acquittal, and Hung Juries as a Function
of Jury Size and Jury Decision Rule (mimeographed paper available from the author
at State University of New York at Stony Brook, 1974). Grofiman adds to the previous
literature by speaking in terms of the probability of convicting an innocent defendant
and the probability of not convicting a guilty defendant. He also assumes, however, an
independent probability model and further assumes that PIC equals PGN. Partly be-
cause of these assumptions, which he later questions, his deductive model is the only
one that arrives at no conclusions about the effects of jury size. Like the student author
above and unlike the Supreme Court, see text following note 60 infra, Grofman con-
cludes "that changes from a unanimity rule to say a 11-1 or 10-2 or even a 9-3 rule
would have little impact on conviction rates." B. Grofman, supra at 21.
Davis adds to the previous literature by combining deductive modeling with empirical
testing in experimental juries. See Davis, Group Decision and Social Interaction: A
Theory of Social Decision Schemes, 80 PSYCHOLOGICAL Rnv. 97, 104-06 (1973); Davis,
Bray & Holt, The Empirical Study of Social Decision Processes in Juries, in LAw, Jus-
TICE, AND THE INDImVDuAL Tim Socmiry (J. Tapp & F. Levine eds., in press 1976). Davis
also combines deductive modeling with a social psychological perspective that does not
assume the majority always wins. His model has the disadvantage of being the most
complicated of the deductive models discussed above, and of involving a kind of ad hoe
multiplicative probability that does not involve recognized binomial or Poisson distribu-
tions, although it does make use of multinomial concepts. His multinomial categories
refer to the three, rather than two, categories of convict, acquit, or hung within a jury.
He concludes, as the present paper does, that "the theoretically possible difference be-
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PGN, GN, USE, and WSE is the same as that used in Tables 2 and 3.
The formulas for calculating PIC and PGC are changed to take into
consideration our new combination of the independent-mind and collec-
tive-mind models. In the independent-mind model, we calculated PIC
for various NJ's by determining (0.9 2 6 )"J where 0.926 = (0.40)2.
Using the collective-mind model, PIC is constant at 0.40, regardless of
the size of the jury, as long as the jury consists of average jurors who
would vote to convict an innocent person 40 percent of the time (the
original assumption for PIC). Under the combination approach, PIC
represents the weighted average of those two approaches, with the
independent probability model receiving a weight of 0.13 and the
collective-mind model receiving a weight of 1.00. This assumes that the
weights assigned to collective and independent elements of jury decision-
TABLE 4. REVISED CONVICTION PROBABILITIES AND NUMBER OF
ERRORS FOR VARIOUS JURY SIZES
(Combined Independent and Collective Model)
Prob. Number Prob. Prob. Number Unwtd. Weighted
Jury Size Innocent Innocent Guilty Guilty Guilty Sum of Sum of
(NJ) Cony. Cony. Conv. Not Cony. Not Cony. Errors Errors
(PIC) (#C) (PGC) (PGN) (#GN) (USE) (WSE)
15 .390 19.5 .693 .307 291.2 310.7 486.2
14 .393 19.7 .696 .304 289.1 308.8 486.1
13 .396 19.8 .698 .302 287.0 306.8 485.0
12 .400 20.0 .700 .300 285.0 305.0 485.0
11 .403 20.2 .703 .297 282.4 302.6 484.4
10 .407 20.4 .705 .295 280.1 300.5 484.1
9 .412 20.6 .708 .292 277.6 298.2 483.6
8 .416 20.8 .710 .290 275.1 295.9 483.2
*7 .421 21.1 .713 .287 272.6 293.7 483.1*
6 .427 21.3 .716 .284 269.9 291.2 483.2
5 .432 21.6 .719 .281 267.2 289.8 483.4
4 .439 21.9 .722 .278 264.3 286.3 483.6
3 .445 22.3 .725 .275 261.4 283.7 484.1
2 .453 22.6 .728 .272 258.5 281.1 484.8
1 .461 23.0 .731 .269 255.4 278.4 485.7
Formulas for the columns (discrepancies are due to rounding):
PIC = [0.13(.926)NJ + 0.401 / 1.13. #IC - (PIC) (50).
PGC = [0.13(.971)NJT + 0.70]/1.13. PGN = 1.0 - PGC.
#GN = (PGN) (950).
USE = #IC + #GN. WSE = 10(#IC) + (#GN).
* Value at which WSE is minimized.
tween juries of six and 12 is at a maximum only about 8% for the simple majority social
decision rule, and under most conditions even smaller. Thus, very large samples of ex-
ceptionally 'noise-free' data would be required to pick up this difference." Davis, Bray
& Holt, supra (emphasis in original).
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making are the same, whether the jury is judging an average defendant,
an innocent defendant, or a guilty defendant. There is no reason to
assume that the characteristics of a defendant would affect the balance
of those two elements. The combination PGC is then a weighted
average between the independent probability of (0. 9 7 1 )N, and the
collective probability of 0.70.
In Table 4, as in Tables 2 and 3, when the jury size decreases, the
probability of an innocent person being convicted increases and the
probability of a guilty person not being convicted decreases. Since
there are likely to be many more guilty defendants in the system than
innocent defendants, the unweighted sum of errors also keeps decreasing
as the jury size decreases. The most important column is again the last,
showing the weighted sum of errors. Because the number of innocent
defendants convicted is weighted as ten times more important than the
number of guilty defendants not convicted, the weighted sum of errors
decreases, until we reach a jury size of seven persons at the minimum
WSE level, and then begins increasing. This is precisely the optimum
jury size determined by the independent-mind model alone.
If we were to make a graph like Figure 1 of our new WSE curve, the
new WSE curve would reach its lowest point close to an NJ of a seven-
person jury, just as did the WSE curve based only on the independent
probability model. We can confirm that result by determining the slope
of WSE relative to NJ, using our new formulas shown at the bottom of
Table 4. When we set that slope equal to zero and solve for NJ, we find
that the solution is the same in the independent and complete models.31
31. The procedure for finding the minimum point of the curve is essentially that
given in note 21 supra, because the weighting factors in the completed model drop out
when we set the expression for the slope of the weighted-sum-of-errors (WSE) curve
equal to zero. This is another way of saying that the independent probability model
determines the shape of the curve. The complete derivation of the formula for the value
of NJ at which WSE is minimized is given below. (Note that the W here is the weight
assigned to erroneous convictions, not the weight of the independent-mind model.) To
simplify the expressions, the weight of the independent-mind model is assumed to be
one-half (the two models are simply averaged). We begin with the expression for WSE
in terms of NJ:
1. WsE = w ' + C (#I) + (#G) - pgcN3 + PGQ1 (#G)
2 2
(Substituting the combination perspective for the independent probability per-
spective)
2. WSE = (W) (% picG + ' PIC2) (#I) + (#G) - ( pgcNy + 2
PGC 12) (#G)
(Dividing both parts of the numerator in the compromise perspective by 2)
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In contrast to both Table 2 and Figure 1, however, our new WSE curve
is quite flat. Table 2 showed a WSE as high as 497 with an NJ of 15,
and as low as 468 with an NJ of seven. The more accurate Table 4,
however, shows a WSE only as high as 486.2 with an NJ of 15 and only
as low as 483.1 with an NJ of seven. The numbers in Table 4 were
carried out to an extra digit to show more clearly the trends in each
column and the minimum value of WSE. Since the combination ap-
proach of Table 4 comes closer to the collective-mind approach, it
follows that there is less relation between jury size and the sum of errors.
If a purely collective-mind approach had been used, there would have
been no relation at all between jury size and the weighted sum of errors.
Because the results are virtually the same for all jury sizes from six to
twelve, one might conclude from Table 4 that jury size has very little
effect on the weighted sum of errors. The calculated differences ob-
served might be attributed to our reasonable but unverifiable premises
that PIC12 = 0.40, PGC12 = 0.70, or #G = 950/1000. In fact,
there may be little or no difference between juries of six or twelve,
3. WSE (W)(y2)(piC)NJ(#I) + (W)( R)(PIC1 2)(#I) + (#G) - (k)
(pgc)N(#G) - (%)(PGC12 )(#G)
(Removing the brackets by multiplying)
4. (W)(%) (pic)N-T(#I)(LN pie) + 0+0 - (h )(pgc)NT(#G)(LN pgc)
(Setting the slope of WSE with respect to NJ equal to zero)
5. (W) (%) (pic)N(#I) (LN pie) = (%) (pgc)NJ(#G) (LN pgc)
(Adding to both sides and removing the zero slopes)
6. (pic)NJ (1/a)(#G)(LN pgc)
(.pgc)NI" (W)(%)(#I)(LN pic)
(Dividing both sides)
The 's cancel out on the right side, and we have an expression identical to that which
would be derived from the independent probability model alone. Solving for NJ, we get:
7. NJlog(pic) - NJlog(pgc) = log K
(Substituting K for the right side and taking log of both sides)
8. NJ(log pie - log pgc) = log K
(Factoring out NJ)
log K
9. NJ = (log pie - log pgc)(Dividingboth sides)
log (#G) (LN pgc) -
10. NJ* = (#I)(LNPic)
(log pic) - (log pgc)
NJ* is the value of NJ at which WSE is minimized, the optimum jury size. Substituting
the appropriate numerical values from Table 2 or 4 yields an optimum value of seven
(to the nearest integer).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1975/iss4/2
OPTIMUM JURY SIZE
although some authors have hypothesized or purported to find signifi-
cant differences.3 2 A conclusion that jury size makes no difference
might lead one to preserve the status quo of twelve jurors or it might
lead one to advocate a switch to a jury of six on the theory that when in
doubt, one should choose the simplest or least costly alternative.
The data presented in Table 4, however, do not necessitate a conclu-
sion that jury size is irrelevant to jury errors. First, much larger
differences can easily be obtained by simply changing the normative
trade-off weight. For example, if we are quite prosecution minded, we
could give a much greater weight to an error of not convicting the guilty
than to an error of convicting the innocent. Conversely, if we are quite
defense minded, we could give a much greater weight to an error of
convicting the innocent. Either way, we could justify six- or twelve-
person juries on the basis of substantial differences in the weighted sum
of errors. Working backwards from the jury size to trade-off weight,
we find that the use of a twelve-person unanimous jury implies a trade-
off weight that is 13,33 rather than Blackstone's ten. This indicates
(assuming our empirical premises are reasonable) that society by sup-
porting the twelve-person unanimous jury considers convicting the
innocent 13 times worse than not convicting the guilty and is impliedly
willing to let 13 guilty persons go free to save one innocent person from
conviction.
A second, closely related way to see big differences in Table 4 is to
note that in the course of 1000 trials, 21.3 innocent defendants are
likely to be convicted by a six-person jury, while only 20 innocent
32. It is not so unusual to find that hotly-disputed alternative legal policies have lit-
tle difference in their effects. See, e.g., R. DIXON, DEMOCRATIC REPRESENTATION: RE-
APPORTIONMENT IN LAW AND PoLmcs 574-81 (1968) (equal apportionment may be ir-
relevant to actual legislative outcomes); Rosenberg, Comparative Negligence in Arkan-
sas: A "Before and After" Survey, 13 ARK. L. REV. 89 (1959) (contributory negligence
rules may be irrelevant to issue of court congestion).
33. In note 31 supra, we derived a general equation for determining the optimum
NJ for a jury deciding unanimously, given W, #G, #1, pgc, and pic:
(#G) (LN pgc)
log
(W) (#I) (LN pie)
NJ* =
(log pic) - (log pgc)
If we set NJ* equal to twelve, substitute the appropriate numerical values for #G, #,
pgc, and pic fiom Tables 2 and 4, and solve for W, we find that W equals 101.1 or 13.
In other words, if the trade-off weight is 13, a twelve-person jury is the optimum jury
size in terms of achieving the minimum weighted sum of errors.
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defendants are likely to be convicted by a twelve-person jury. That 1.3
difference represents a 6Y2 percent increase over 20 defendants, or a
six percent decrease from 21.3 defendants. It does sound socially
undesirable to increase the number of innocent defendants convicted by
6% percent. It sounds even worse to note that the probability of
convicting an innocent defendant goes up from 0.40 to 0.427 when a
jurisdiction changes from a twelve-person jury to a six-person jury. That
is almost a seven percent increase in the probability of an innocent
person being convicted (0.027/0.40). Conversely, someone con-
cerned about not convicting the guilty might note that the probability of
a guilty defendant not being convicted rises from 0.284 for a six-person
jury to 0.297 for a twelve-person jury. That represents an increase of
almost five percent (0.013/0.284).
2. Fraction Required to Convict
Larger differences in the weighted sum of errors result from varying
the fraction required to convict as well as the jury size. This would
involve creating a Table 5 analogous to Table 3. In that new table, we
would calculate a combination PIC by the formula
P 0.13(ALP) + 0.40
1.13
where ALP stands for the "at least" probability (for example, at least
eleven out of twelve) that is calculated by using the binomial probability
formula or the Poisson probability table. Since the ALP's have already
been calculated in columns 2 and 4 of Table 3, we need only insert those
numbers into the above formula and calculate our new combined PIC.
For example, Table 3 gives 0.78 as the probability of convicting an
innocent defendant with a fraction required to convict of 11/12.
Therefore, the combination PIC would be
PIC = 0.13(0.78) + 0.40 =1.13 0.44.
Similarly, since Table 3 gives 0.95 as the probability of convicting a
guilty defendant with a fraction required to convict of 11/12, the
combination PGC would be
PGC = 0.13(0.95) + 0.70
1.13 = 0.73.
[Vol. 1975:933
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Table 5 was prepared in the same manner, using the probabilities from
Table 3 to calculate the revised data for our combination model.8 4
TABLE 5. REVISED CONVICTION PROBABILITIES AND NUMBER OF
ERRORS FOR VARIOUS FRACTIONS REQUIRED TO CONVICT
WITH 1000 DEFENDANTS
(Combined Independent and Collective Model)
Fraction
Required Prob. Number Prob. Prob. Number Unwtd. Weighted
to Innocent Innocent Guilty Guilty Guilty Sum of Sum of
Convict Cony. Cony. Cony. Not Conv. Not Cony. Errors Errors(NC/NJ) (PIC) (#IC) (PGC) (PGN) (#GN) (USE) (WSE)
12/12 .400 20.0 .700 .300 285.0 305.0 485.0
10/10 .407 20.4 .705 .295 280.6 301.0 484.1
8/8 .416 20.8 .710 .290 275.2 296.0 483.3
6/6 .426 21.3 .716 .284 269.7 291.0 483.0
011/12 .444 22.2 .729 .271 257.7 279.9 479.6*
9/10 .449 22.5 .730 .270 256.6 279.1 481.3
7/8 .456 22.8 .731 .269 255.5 278.3 483.7
$010/12 .460 23.0 .732 .268 254.4 277.4 484.3**
5/6 .461 23.0 .732 .268 254.4 277.4 484.9
8/10 .462 23.1 .732 .268 254.4 277.5 485.5
9/12 .466 23.3 .733 .267 253.3 276.6 486.1
6/8 .467 23.3 .733 .267 253.3 276.6 486.7
7/10 .467 23.3 .733 .267 253.3 276.6 486.7
8/12 .468 23.4 .735 .265 252.2 275.6 486.1
4/6 .469 23.5 .735 .265 252.2 275.7 486.7
5/8 .469 23.5 .735 .265 252.2 275.7 486.7
6/10 .469 23.5 .735 .265 252.2 275.7 486.7
7/12 .469 23.5 .735 .265 252.2 275.7 486.7
Formulas for the columns (discrepancies are due to rounding):
PIC - [0.13 (Table 3 Prob.) + 0.40] / 1.13. #IC = (PIC) (50).
PGC = [0.13 (Table 3 Prob.) + 0.701/1.13. PGN = 1.0 - PGC.
#GN " (PGN) (950).
USE = #IC + #GN. WSE = 10(#IC) + (#GN).
* Value of NJ where WSE is minimized, with one dissent allowed.
** Value of NJ where WSE is minimized, with two dissents allowed.
34. For ease in calculating the probabilities in Table 5, the PIC formula can be
0.13(Table 3 Prob.) + 0.40
given as , and the PGC formula as1.13
0.13(Table 3 Prob.) + 0.70
1.13
0.13 (Table 2 Prob.) + 0.40
Unmilarly, the PIC formula in Table 4 could be given as 1.13
0.13(Table 3 Prob.) + 0.70
ad the PGC formula in Table 4 as 0._3_(abl_3__ob)_+0.7
1.13
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Table 5 shows that the smallest weighted sum of errors occurs when
only one dissent out of twelve votes is allowed. When two dissents are
allowed, a jury of twelve-as opposed to a smaller jury-still produces
the smallest weighted sum of errors. These are the same results that
appeared in Table 3; the WSE curve bottoms out at the same point, even
though the curve is now flatter.
Although there is less variance in WSE values under the combination
model, the values vary slightly more when we change the fraction re-
quired to convict than when we change the size of the jury as in Table
4. Thus, Table 5 shows that within the minimum constraints of a
majority rule and a six- to twelve-person jury, the WSE can rise to 486.7
at a fraction required to convict of 7/12 and fall to 479.6 at a fraction
required to convict of 11/12. Table 4 shows that within the minimum
constraints of a unanimity rule (conviction requires no dissents) and a
six- to twelve-person jury, the WSE can only rise to 485.0 at an NJ of
twelve and fall to 483.1 at an NJ of seven. Because PIC is not
dependent on any of the premises about W, #G, or PGC12, a compari-
son of the range of PIC values in Table 4 with the range in Table 5
shows most clearly the difference between changing jury size and chang-
ing the fraction required to convict. Lowering NJ from twelve to six
raises PIC from 0.40 to 0.43, an increase of eight percent; lowering the
fraction required to convict from 12/12 to 7/12, however, raises the
PIC from 0.40 to 0.47, an increase of 18 percent. Even if we assumed
a PIC other than 0.40 for a twelve-person unanimous jury, lowering the
fraction required to convict from 12/12 to 7/12 would still produce a
substantial increase in the probability of an innocent person being
convicted.
V. EFFECTS OF CHANGES IN ASSUMPTIONS OR DATA
Having constructed a reasonably complete model of jury behavior
that predicts the jury size that will produce the minimum weighted sum
of errors-the optimum jury-we should test the sensitivity of the model
to changes in the empirical data and in the assumptions used in con-
structing it.35 The model is stable with respect to most of its premises,
35. This will test our model's conformity to the first and fourth criteria established
for a good deductive model: whether its premises are reasonable and how sensitive the
conclusions are to changes in those premises. See note 10 supra. Sensitivity testing tra-
ditionally serves another function, however; it indicates the degree to which the model
depends on data or premises that may be subject to considerable change. The sensitivity
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but its predictions vary quite drastically according to the assumption we
make about the proportion of all defendants who are truly guilty. This
discovery exemplifies one of the strengths of model building: the identi-
fication of critical variables that are not intuitively obvious. In this case
we can conclude with some assurance that the choice of an optimum
jury size depends heavily on the assumption made about the proportion
of truly guilty defendants among all defendants who receive jury trials.
A. Effects of Changing the Normative Premises on the Optimum
Unanimous Jury Size
1. Normative Premises Other than the Trade-Off Weight
Our model assumes that the optimum jury should minimize the
weighted sum of the number of innocent defendants convicted plus the
number of guilty defendants not convicted. Another goal would be to
minimize the number of innocent convicted. This choice can be ex-
pressed by giving #IC an infinite weight over #GN. Such a goal
would result in an infinitely large optimum jury size deciding by unani-
mous decision, because only then would we never convict any innocent
people-although we would never convict any guilty people, either. A
more realistic goal would be to minimize the number of innocent
convicted, with the constraint of a maximum jury size of twelve. As
already noted, the use of a jury of twelve is the equivalent of giving
#IC a weight of 13 (rather than Blackstone's weight of ten or a weight
of infinity) and then minimixing the sum of #IC plus GN.3"
At first glance, one might think a reasonable goal would be to
minimize the weighted sum of PIC and PGN, in other words, the
probabilities, rather than the number, of errors. It is not possible,
however, to minimize the two kinds of errors without including both the
probabilities and the number of innocent and guilty defendants out of
1000 or N defendants. Otherwise, we may have the irrational outcome
of minimizing a percentage figure (PIC + PGN) but not the actual
number of erroneous convictions (PIC (#I) + PGN (#G)), which
equals each probability weighted by how often it is applied.
of a model is equivalent to its reliability in changed circumstances. To test the validity
of a model, its predictions are matched against empirical results. As we noted earlier,
predictions about the numbers of jury errors are inherently difficult to test empirically,
and thus the deductive models proposed in this Article are also inherently difficult to
validate completely.
36. See note 33 supra and accompanying text.
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Some apparently different goals turn out to be identical to the mini-
mum WSE with which we have worked. For instance, we might try to
maximize the weighted sum of the guilty convicted plus the innocent not
convicted or maximize the weighted difference of the guilty convicted
minus the innocent convicted. Both goals are equivalent to minimizing
the weighted sum of errors.
There are, however, some quite different criteria for determining
optimum jury size. Such criteria, or goals, include representation of the
community. A randomly selected twelve-person jury is more likely to
be representative than a randomly selected six-person jury since, by
chance, six jurors are all more likely to be unusual in some demograph-
ic dimensions than twelve jurors. For example, if blacks constitute ten
percent of the population of a community, as they do in the United
States as a whole, then the probability of obtaining twelve out of twelve
whites on a jury is (0.90)12 or 0.28. With only a six-person jury, the
probability of obtaining an all white jury increases to (0.90)0 or 0.53,
or more than 50 percent. We could change our normative goal to
minimizi1ng
(#Ic)wi (#GN)W2 (PEM)w,
where PEM stands for the probability of completely excluding some
minority from the jury, given the percentage the minority constitutes
within the larger population from which jurors are drawn. Each of the
three factors gets its own exponential weight, and the factors are multi-
plied, rather than added, because they are not all measured in the same
units. A model such as this might give very different results from the
one considered here.
Other goals are sometimes mentioned in the controversy over the
desirability of jury trials versus bench trials. These goals, however,
relate more to the question whether jury trials should be abolished in
general, or in certain kinds of cases, than to the more limited question of
what size a jury should be. For example, some people argue that the
jury system produces excessive delay, but some of the delay attributed to
juries has nothing to do with their size. Jury-selection and deliberation
are probably somewhat longer with a twelve-person jury than with a six-
person jury, but these considerations seem minor. The jury system is
often defended because it gives the public a greater sense of involvement
in the judicial process and an opportunity to inject communal opinion
into the law. These considerations, however, are probably not substan-
tially enhanced by changing the size of the jury. Similarly, the fraction
[Vol. 1975:933
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required to convict has little effect on the goals of reducing court delay
and increasing public participation, although a smaller fraction may
speed deliberation and give more of a sense of majority control.3 7
2. The Trade-ofi Weight
The normative assumption that seems most subject to change is that a
trade-off weight of ten is appropriate in evaluating the relative undesira-
bility of convicting the innocent and not convicting the guilty. The
figure ten is used because it was suggested by Blackstone, who influ-
enced the authors of the Constitution, and also because it is a nice
round number to work with. One alternative would be to use the trade-
off weight that makes a twelve-person jury the optimum size for a unan-
imous jury. Since a twelve-person jury implies a trade-off weight of
13,38 our tentative assumption of ten as a trade-off weight is probably a
reasonable one.
The trade-off weight implicit in any given jury size, or the optimum
jury size for any given trade-off weight, can be determined by inserting
different values in the equation we previously developed for determining
the minimum WSE as a function of NJ. 39 Experimenting with different
trade-off weights (W) shows that when W is less than 9.5, the optimum
jury size falls below six, which is the smallest jury that the Supreme
Court has permitted in criminal cases; when W is greater than 13, the
optimum jury size is larger than twelve, which is probably the maximum
jury size that is politically feasible. This experimentation both confirms
the reasonability of our choice of W - 10 and demonstrates that other
choices would not greatly change the outcome of our calculations.
B. Effects of Changing the Empirical Premises on the Optimum
Unanimous Jury Size
1. The Premise that PGC1 2 is 0.70
Because the equation 0 for minimizing WSE expresses the relation
between optimum NJ and PGC12, PIC12, and #G, the equation can
37. For a discussion of the relevance of the jury system to public participation and
court delay, see H. ZEISEL, H. KALVEN & B. BUCHOLZ, DELAY IN THE COURT 71-109
(1959); Broeder, The University of Chicago Jury Project, 38 NEB. L. REv. 744 (1959);
Pabst, Statistical Studies of the Costs of Six-Man Versus Twelve-Man Juries, 14 WM.
& MARYL. Rnv. 326 (1972).
38. See note 33 supra and accompanying text.
39. See notes 21, 31, 33 supra.
40. See id.
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also be used to test the effects on optimum jury size of substituting
different values for those three basic parameters. First with regard to
PGC2, we estimated the probability of a guilty defendant being con-
victed by a twelve-person unanimous jury to be 0.70. This probability
cannot be less than 0.64, since that is the known probability of an
average defendant being convicted by a twelve-person unanimous jury,
and presumably a truly guilty defendant is at least as likely to be
convicted as an average defendant. Nor can the probability be greater
than 1.00, which is equivalent to certainty. In fact, PGC probably
cannot be much higher than 0.70 unless the proportion of truly guilty
defendants is much smaller than the 95 percent we have assumed. If 95
percent were truly guilty, a PGC of 0.71 would result in 695 out of
1000 defendants being convicted, but the Kalven and Zeisel data tell us
that only about 640 out of 1000 defendants are convicted.
Testing the effect of varying PGC between 0.64 and 0.70 while
holding the other variables constant, we find that as PGC goes down,
the optimum jury size also goes down. In other words, as the guilty
become harder to convict, smaller juries are needed because they are
more likely to convict. A PGC below 0.68 would yield an optimumjury size below six. Since juries smaller than six are not now accepta-
ble, however, if PGC were, in fact, much smaller than we have assumed,
our normative goals would have to be revised. We could either remove
the normative constraint excepting juries smaller than six persons or
change the trade-off weight to make the weighted sum of errors fall
between optimum NJ's of six and twelve.
In summary, PGC cannot be higher than the 0.70 value we have
chosen and is unlikely to be much lower; to some extent, however, its
value depends on the value of #G.
2. The Premise that PIC2 is 0.40
With respect to PICv, the probability of an innocent defendant being
convicted before a twelve-person unanimous jury, we estimated a value
of 0.40. PIC12 must be smaller than 0.64, since that is the known
probability of the average defendant being convicted, and presumably a
truly innocent defendant is less likely to be convicted than an average
defendant. Nor can PIC fall below zero, since it is impossible to have a
negative number of defendants convicted. If the number of truly
innocent defendants is small, however, PIC, unlike PGC, can vary
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substantially without having much effect on the total number of defend-
ants convicted. In other words, if only about 50 defendants out of 1000
are innocent, then PIC could be 0.60, rather than 0.40, and would add
only 30 convicted innocent defendants (0.60 times 50), rather than 20
(0.40 times 50), to the 665 convicted guilty defendants (0.70 times
950). Whatever the trade-off weight given to #IC, changes in PIC
have very little effect on our calculation of optimum jury size. With a
0.40 value for PIC, we get an optimum jury of seven which is in accord
with Tables 2 and 4. For PIC = 0.20, the optimum jury is eight (after
rounding to the nearest integer). This small increase in optimum jury
size provides further confirmation that the model is not subject to wild
fluctuations in its conclusions from small changes in its probability
premises.
3. The Premise That #G is 950
The number of guilty defendants per 1000 defendants, #G, was
estimated as 950.41 If PGC is held constant, #G cannot vary greatly
without causing the number of defendants convicted to vary substantial-
ly from the known figure of 640 convictions per 1000 defendants. For
example, if #G were 600, then 420 guilty and 160 innocent defendants
would be convicted, for a total of 580 convictions, 42 which is far below
the known figure of 640. Similarly, if #G, were 980, then 687 guilty
and 8 innocent defendants would be convicted, for a total of 695
convictions, which is far above the known figure of 640. Not only do
such changes in #G create substantial variations from the known
number of convictions, but even relatively small variations in #G, can
cause large variations in optimum jury size. Thus, if #G = 900, the
optimum jury size would be 23, which is the size of grand juries, rather
than trial juries. As #G goes down, the optimum jury size rises; to
offset the greater number of innocent defendants who are then being
tried and need to be protected from conviction, a larger jury, which is
less likely to err in that direction, is needed. Unlike the variables W,
PGC 12, and PIC12 the variable #G adds an unstable element to the
model. It is unstabilizing because it can vary widely, and such varia-
41. Note that the variable #I is not really a separate variable, since it is a function
of #G by virtue of the definitional relation, #I = 1000 - #G or #G = 1000 -
#I.
42. (#G)(PGC) + (#I)(PIC) = (600)(0.70) + (400)(0.40) = 420 + 160 =
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tions will produce large changes in the calculated optimum jury size.
Perhaps we have been too lenient, however, in allowing #G, to vary
so widely; we may have needlessly allowed too much looseness in the
model. What we should require is that PGC12, PIC12, and #G be
estimated in such a way that jointly they (1) make theoretical sense in
light of relevant aspects of the criminal justice system, such as the
prosecutor's incentives to avoid prosecuting innocent persons, and (2)
mathematically generate exactly 640 convictions without any upward or
downward leeway. Because PGC and #G are mutually dependent,48
empirical research would be required to determine their values when
taken alone. It may be that the proportion of truly guilty defendants is
lower than we assumed, but that juries only very rarely fail, to convict
guilty defendants. Nevertheless, the values of PGC and #G assumed
for the model do jointly produce reasonable results in accord with
available empirical data, which is the best we can do given the present
state of knowledge. Perhaps the identification of these parameters as
crucial will stimulate further empirical research on the behavior of
juries, the relative number of truly guilty defendants, and the relations
among these and other variables affecting jury errors.44
C. Effects of Changing the Premises on the Optimum Nonunanimous
Fraction Required to Convict
Testing the effect of changes in our assumptions or empirical data is
more difficult when we attempt to establish the optimum jury size under
rules other than a rule of unanimity. This difficulty is due to the
greater complexity that probability expressions introduce into the for-
mula relating jury size to the other variables. 45  The calculations needed
43. PGC and #G are together constrained by the known proportion of 640 convic-
tions per 1000 cases.
44. The reader can extend this sensitivity analysis by determining the effect that
a change in one of the variables W, PIC1 2, PGC1 2, or #G would have on one or more
of the others, rather than on the optimum jury size. The equation derived in note 31
supra could be used with NJ* set equal to twelve and all but two of the parameter vari-
ables set at their Table 1 values. One of the two parameters would then be changed
to see how changing it affects the other parameter. Such an analysis demonstrates the
interdependence of the variables in the model.
45. A generalized expression giving NJ as a function of WSE, comparable to the
one developed in note 31 supra, would contain a series of probability expressions in the
form of the binomial probability expression. See note 22 supra. Ordinary algebraic
techniques are inadequate to arrive at a general solution for such an equation in terms
of NJ, which appears as part of a series of complicated exponential expressions. Estab-
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to test variations of all the variables would be extensive and difficult to
perform, and would add very little to the qualitative discussion. To find
the overall optimum result, we would first determine the optimum
fraction for any given jury size, and then repeat the process for each
possible jury size. From what we have already discovered, however, we
know that there are feasibility and consistency constraints. Within
those constraints, changes in the estimated PGC2 and especially PIC12
have little effect on the optimum fraction of votes needed for a convic-
tion, just as feasible changes in those values have little effect on opti-
mum jury size, although changes in #G can have substantial effects,
depending on how much change is allowed. A more extensive analysis
would show that the effects of changes in the normative premises,
particularly with regard to the size of the trade-off weight, are somewhat
narrowly confined if the other estimated variables are held constant. The
direction, rather than the magnitude, of the direct or inverse relation
between W, PGC12, PIC12, and #G on the one hand and the optimum
number of votes on the other hand would be the same as in the relation
with optimum jury size under a rule of unanimity.46
VI. VARIATIONS ON THE BASIc MODEL
The basic model, with its average jurors, juries, and cases, can be
varied to consider dissimilarities among jurors and juries, different types
of cases, criminal or civil, and the general effect of group size on the
quality of group decisionmaking.
A. Jury Representativeness with Respect to Conviction Probabilities
1. The Problem and the Formula for Resolving It
Smaller juries are less likely than larger juries to be representative of
the average jury. We assumed in both our independent-mind and
collective-mind models that all twelve jurors were roughly alike and
average. In our combination model, we likewise accept these assump-
fishing a minimum value for such an expression would be a difficult problem in generat-
ing reiterative approximations, and its difficulty would be far out of proportion to the
value of the solution.
46. To determine the new optimum values when W, PGC12, PIC2, and OG are
changed from the values we have been using of 10, 0.70, 0.40, and 950 out of 1000,
we can apply the binomial probability formula, see note 22 supra, to create a new Table
3. From the last or WSE column of that new Table 3, we can observe when WSE is
minimized and thus observe what the new optimums for different jury sizes are.
Vol. 1975:933]
Washington University Open Scholarship
970 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 1975:933
tions about the average jurors on juries of all sizes. Tables 4 and 5
might change, however, if we abandoned our assumption of homogenei-
ty of juror characteristics.
The characteristic of jurors most important for predicting the out-
come of criminal cases is not race, sex, age, political party affiliation,
urbanism, or any other demographic characteristic, although such char-
acteristics may have some predictive or explanatory value.41 Nor is it
an attitudinal characteristic such as economic liberalism, civil libertari-
anism, or even tolerance of criminal behavior.4 s Rather, the most
important predictive characteristic of a juror is his propensity to convict.
We know from the Kalven and Zeisel data that the average juror has a
propensity to convict of 0.677, that is, if we examine an average sample
of 100 juries or 1200 votes, we would find about 812 votes for convic-
tion and about 388 votes for acquittal.49 Thus, our key question is how
the size of a jury affects the jury's representativeness with respect to
juror propensity to convict.5°
47. Some studies indicate that judicial background characteristics correlate with judi-
cial decisions in divided cases. J. HOGARTH, SENTENCING AS A HUMAN PROCESS 211-28
(1971); Nagel, Judicial Backgrounds and Criminal Cases, 53 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 333
(1962), reprinted in S. NAGEL, THE LEGAL PROCESS FROM A BEHAVIORAL PIERSPECTIVE,
ch. 18 (1969). Background characteristics tend to be especially explanatory when they
are analyzed in combination rather than one at a time. See Goldman, Voting Behavior
on the US. Courts of Appeals Revisited, AM. POL. ScI. REv. (1975); Nagel, Multiple
Correlation of Judicial Backgrounds and Decisions, 2 FLA. Sr. U.L. REv. 258 (1974),
reprinted in S. NAGEL, IMPROVING THE LEGAL PROCESS: EFFECTS OF ALTERNATIVES, ch.
12 (1975). If the cases could be held constant, we would probably find an even
stronger relation between jurors' backgrounds and their decisions than with judges.
Jurors are freer to inject their backgrounds into their decisions because they do not have
to write opinions justifying their decisions, they deal with more subjective factual issues,
and they are not expected to follow precedent as closely.
48. See, e.g., Becker, et al., The Influence of Judges' Values on their Verdicts- A
Courts and Politics Experiment, Sw. SocIAL SCL Q. 130 (1965); Boehm, Mr. Prejudice,
Miss Sympathy, and the Authoritarian Personality: An Application of Psychological
Measuring Techniques to the Problem of Jury Bias, 1968 Wis. L. REV. 734; Nagel &
Weitzman, Sex and the Unbiased Jury, 56 JuDiCATUu 108 (1972).
49. See note 25 supra and accompanying text.
50. Even though we can better predict how a jury will decide if we know the convic-
tion propensities of each juror, it may still be useful to know the relation between de-
cisions and backgrounds and attitudes. Backgrounds and attitudes can serve as indirect
measures or predictors of conviction propensities. If we can show that the sex of jurors
or juries correlates with case outcomes, we can more easily seek to have juries include
more women. Demographic representativeness can also be justified for its symbolic sig-
nificance in giving various demographic groups a feeling of participation in the judicial
process, which possibly increases both their respect and that of others for the legal sys-
tem.
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If we have an infinitely large population of jurors, and the average
juror in that population has a 0.677 propensity to convict, then we can
determine approximately the range of the averages or means of 100 sets
of twelve-person juries, or 100 sets of ten-, eight-, and six-person juries,
drawn at random. We know that not all of the 100 sets of twelve-
person juries would have 0.677 as the average of their individual jurors'
propensities to convict. One set of twelve drawn from that infinite
population might have a 0.823 average, and another set might have a
0.591 average. Presumably, if we added the averages for each twelve-
person set and divided by 100, that overall average would be about
0.677, but the interesting question is how far from this overall average
would the individual juries fall. What would be the range, for instance,
in which we would expect to find the 50 sets of juries closest to the
average?
To answer that last question involves some relatively simple arithme-
tic. Fifty percent of the juries are likely to have an average that falls
within a range around 0.677 of plus or minus the square root of the
quotient 0.677 (1.0 - 0.677), with that square root multiplied by what
NJ-1
is known as the critical t-score at the 0.50 level. Suppose, for example,
that NJ is twelve. If we consult a comprehensive t-score table which is
available in many statistics textbooks, 5' we find that at the 0.50 level
with NJ - 1 equal to eleven, the t-score is 0.697. This means that 50
percent of our twelve-person juries would have pac averages within the
range of 0.677 + or - 0.697 V0.219/11 where the 0.219 = (0.677) (1
- 0.677). In other words, 50 percent of our twelve-person juries would
have averages between 0.579 and 0.775. Conversely, 50 percent of our
twelve-person juries would have averages outside that range.
2. Applying and Interpreting the Results of the Formula
If we apply the same probabilistic reasoning to the drawing of 100
sets of six-person juries, then we would expect to find 50 percent of our
six-person juries with pac averages within the range between 0.525 and
0.829. As the jury size becomes smaller, the range into which 50
percent of the juries are likely to fall becomes larger. Thus, while the
51. The t-table used is the one available in T. WONNACOTr & R. WoNNACOr'r, supra
note 17, at 481, which includes the 0.50 level. For discussion of how to use the table
with proportions, see id. at 174-78. A t-table is used because sample sizes of twelve
and six are too small to use the more common normal-curve table.
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50 percent range for twelve-person juries involves a 0.20 spread between
0.58 and 0.78, the range for six-person juries involves a 0.30 spread
between 0.53 and 0.83, a substantial increase in both absolute and
percentage terms.
We could apply the same probabilistic reasoning to the individual
juror's propensity to convict an innocent defendant (pic) or the individ-
ual juror's propensity to convict a guilty defendant (pgc). For pie, 50
percent of the twelve-person juries fall within the range 0.36 to 0.57, a
spread of 0.21.52 With a six-person jury, the spread is 0.32. For pgc,
we find a spread of 0.19 with a twelve-person jury and a spread of 0.29
with a six-person jury.
In short, when we go from a twelve-person, randomly selected jury, to
a six-person, randomly selected jury, we can expect a substantial devia-
tion from the average pac, pie, and pgc with which we may be working,
whatever they might be. The probability figures shown in columns 2
and 4 of Tables 4 and 5 could now be shown as ranges rather than as
points. The ranges will be substantially wider, and thus prediction will
be substantially more difficult, as the jury becomes smaller. In other
words, changing from twelve-person juries to six-person juries is likely
to change substantially the probability of error in a given case, regard-
less of which of our models is used. 53 Specifically, a drop from twelve
to six in jury size means about a 50 percent increase 4 in the range
52. If we assume (1) the independent probability pie is 0.926, as indicated in Table
1, (2) the collective mind pie is 0.400, also as indicated in Table 1, and (3) the relative
weight of the independent probability approach is 0.13, as previously discussed, then the
true pie is 0.461 by virtue of the formula:
0.13(0.926) + 0.400
true pie =
1.13
With a twelve-person jury, we are thus asking what is 0.461 + or - 0.697 V 0.248/11,
where the 0.248 equals (0.461) (1.0 - 0.461).
53. These calculations also show the need for making jury selection more repre-
sentative of important demographic and attitudinal characteristics, or at least more ran-
dom, to minimize the erratic spread of average jury propensities. This kind of substan-
tial change is associated with representativeness rather than the statistician's "type 1"
errors of convicting the innocent, or "type 2" errors of not convicting the guilty. As
such, this kind of substantial change does not consistently increase or reduce either kind
of error. It simply makes the predictability of both kinds of errors and of jury decision-
making in general more erratic and unpredictable.
54. Individual jury propensities with a spread of about 0.20 increase to a spread of
about 0.30. KA vEN & ZEISL 42. Although Kalven and Zeisel report acquittal per-
centages, approximate conviction percentages can be obtained by taking the complement
of the figures given and subtracting six percent for hung juries, which are more like ac-
quittals than convictions. One can obtain similar conviction percentages from the U.S.
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around the mean in which cases are likely to fall. That seems to be a
high cost to pay in predictability unless the benefits of smaller juries are
worth this cost, in terms of reducing the number of guilty not convicted
or attaining other values maximized by a smaller jury.
B. Other Variations
1. Varying the Crime
Our model is based on conviction data for major crimes, the kind of
cases in the Kalven-Zeisel study. If, however, one wished to prepare a
table like Tables 2 and 3 for certain specialized crimes, the Kalven-
Zeisel data provide conviction probabilities for about 15 different
major crimes. 55 For example, rape has a conviction percentage in the
Kalven-Zeisel data of about 54 percent, less than the average convic-
tion percentage of 64 percent. If a women's or other group were
especially concerned about convicting the guilty in rape cases, that
group might want to prepare a version of Tables 2 and 3 just for rape
cases. Preparing the table would require determining a PGC12 that
would be slightly greater than 0.54, a PIC12 that would be substantially
less than 0.54, a pgc equal to (PGC) 1/ 12 , and a pie equal to
(PIC12 ) 1/12 . A different proportion of truly guilty defendants could
also be assumed. Perhaps the lower conviction percentage for rape
indicates a lower proportion of guilty defendants, although different
crimes have different degrees of provability. If there is any extra
importance to convicting the guilty in rape cases, it is also possible that
the group might attach a smaller normative weight than ten to -#1C.
The greater ease with which twelve-person unanimous juries convict
defendants in minor criminal cases than in major criminal cases may
indicate that society places a relatively lower weight on #IC in the
minor cases. Nevertheless, it may be politically unfeasible, or even
unconstitutional, to have different-sized juries for different kinds of
crimes, except for very gross classifications, such as felonies versus
misdemeanors. The model has enough flexibility to consider all cate-
gories of crimes, however, with their accompanying differences in
P0C 12, PIC12, #G, and the trade-off W. Different crimes may also
have different empirical weights for the relative importance of the
BuptEAU OF THE CENSUS, JUDICiUL. CRNAL STAlTSTICS (1945), which are also reported
in KuA.vEr & ZEISEL 42.
55. KALvEN & ZEISEL 63. The Kalven-Zeisel data also show that in personal injury
cases alone, the average defendant was found liable 56 percent of the time. Id. at 64.
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independent-mind model versus the collective-mind model, depending
on the ability of the crime to stir up dissension and thus cause more
independence and less collective action on the part of jurors.
2. Civil Cases
The model can also be applied to civil cases, although the symbolism
would need changing: one might talk in terms of PLL and PIL, where
PLL is the probability of a truly liable defendant being found liable and
PIL is the probability of a truly innocent defendant being found liable.
Kalven and Zeisel reported that in their sample of civil cases, the
average defendant was found liable 59 percent of the time. Presuma-
bly, a truly liable defendant would have a probability of being found
liable somewhat higher than 0.59, while a truly innocent defendant
would have a probability that would be substantially lower than 0.59.
The normative weight attached to minimizing the number of innocent
defendants found liable (#IL) should probably be substantially less
than the weight attached to minimizing the number of innocent defend-
ants convicted in criminal cases. By imposing a higher standard of
proof in criminal cases and providing a right to free counsel only for
indigent criminal defendants, society clearly indicates that it is more
important to save the innocent from conviction in criminal cases than
the innocent from liability in civil cases.
3. Effect of Group Size on General Accuracy
A final variation could consider the effect of large group size on the
quality of a group's decisionmaking. It is possible that increasing a
jury's size will improve the accuracy of its decisionmaking by reducing
both the probability that the guilty are acquitted and that the innocent
are convicted. This improvement in accuracy may occur if adding
members to the jury means adding more knowledge, perception, intelli-
gence, and deliberation, which may reduce both kinds of jury errors.
Increasing the size of a group may, however, increase the irresponsibility
of individuals and thus the sloppiness of the group product. The
psychological data on the effect of group size on the quality of group
decisionmaking is not only conflicting but also seems to apply principal-
ly to groups that decide by majority decision, or to advisory groups. If
a group must decide unanimously, or nearly unanimously, as a criminal
jury generally must, then the mathematics of unanimous decisionmaking
that we have emphasized seems more relevant than the psychological
studies determining the relation between group size and the number and
[Vol. 1975:933
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kinds of errors likely to be made in other situations.56 Nevertheless, if
the psychological data could ascertain the effect of jury size on delibera-
tion, irresponsibility, and error-making, then those findings could be
incorporated into the model.57
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
Delivering the opinion of the Court in Williams v. Florida, Justice
White stated, "[Clertainly the reliability of the jury as a factfinder
hardly seems likely to be a function of its size."58  In Apodaca v.
Oregon, speaking for the majority, he observed, "In terms of this func-
tion [of providing commonsense accuracy] we perceive no difference
between juries required to act unanimously and those permitted to
convict or acquit by votes of 10 to two or 11 to one."59
Because the empirical premises of our model have not been tested, we
cannot definitively state how much effect jury size or the fraction
required to convict has on the jury's reliability or accuracy. Neverthe-
less, Justice White seems to be wrong in saying that jury size and the
fraction required to convict have no effect on reliability or accuracy. The
model shows that the probability of an innocent person's being convict-
ed increases both as the jury size decreases and as the fraction required
to convict decreases, although the magnitude of these changes depends
on the untested premises. These relations are not suprising, but rather
are in conformity with common sense; the model simply clarifies these
relations. Perhaps Justice White meant only that the increase is not
great enough in his eyes to cross the threshold of unconstitutionality.
56. See, e.g., GROUP DYNAMICS (D. Cartwright & A. Zander eds. 1968); I. JANIs,
VICTIMS OF GRouPTINK: A PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDY OF FOREIGN-POLICY DECISIONS AND
FIASCOES (1972); George, The Case for Multiple Advocacy in Making Foreign Policy,
66 AM. POL. ScI. REv. 751 (1972). For a discussion of the psychological aspects of
group decisionmaking as they pertain to juries, see Kessler, An Empirical Study of Six-
and Twelve-Member Jury Decision-Making Processes, 6 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 712
(1973); Powell, Reducing the Size of Juries, 5 U. McHI. J.L. REFORM 87 (1971); Rosen-
blatt & Rosenblatt, Six-Member Juries in Criminal Cases. Legal and Psychological
Considerations, 47 ST. Jom's L. REv. 615 (1973).
57. The effect of jury size on general accuracy is unclear, especially when a unani-
mous rather than a majority rule is operating, but there are other institutional changes
that might simultaneously reduce both kinds of error. These changes might include al-
lowing jurors to take notes, having training sessions for jurors to improve their percep-
tions and memories, and providing for videotape replaying of portions of the trial. Bet-
ter-qualified defense attorneys and prosecutors, as well as judges with larger operating
budgets, might also reduce both kinds of error.
58. 399 U.S. 78, 100-01 (1970).
59. 406 U.S. 404, 411 (1972).
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The other Justices similarly failed to indicate any substantial aware-
ness of the probabilistic considerations involved in decreasing the size
of the jury or the fraction required to convict.60 They did, however,
intuitively recognize that decreasing the unanimity rule has a greater
effect on the chances of an innocent person being convicted than
decreasing the jury size, at least within the factual ranges presented by a
jury size of six in Williams and a fraction required to convict of ten out
of twelve in Apodaca. That recognition is implicit in the number of
dissenting votes in the two cases: one dissent in Williams versus four in
Apodaca. That three additional judges should dissent in Apodaca is in
conformity with a comparison of the effects of fractions required to
convict in Tables 3 and 5 with the effects of jury size in Tables 2 and 4.
If PIC12 is estimated to be 0.40, Table 3 indicates that an innocent per-
son has a 92 percent chance of being convicted under a 10/12 rule,
whereas Table 2 indicates that such a person has only a 63 percent
chance of being convicted under a 6/6 rule.
Regardless of the value given to PIC12, a 10/12 rule will always result
in a higher probability of the innocent being convicted than a 6/6 rule.
Under our independent probability model, the probability of convicting
an innocent person with a six-person unanimous jury (PIC0) is pie
multiplied by itself six times. The probability of an individual juror
convicting an innocent person (pie) is (PIC 2 )1 / 12 since (PIC12)
- (pie) 12; therefore,
PIC =[(PIC 2) I"2]'= (PIC12)o.
Applying the same reasoning and the binomial probability formula, we
find that the simplified PIC0o/12 formula is"1
60. Justice Douglas, for instance, possibly exaggerates the effect of changing the
fraction required to convict from 12/12 to 10/12 by saying the opinion of the court
"permits prosecutors in Oregon and Louisiana to enjoy a conviction-acquittal ratio sub-
stantially greater than that ordinarily returned by unanimous juries." Johnson v. Lou-
isiana, 406 U.S. 356, 388 (1972).
61. The PIC10/12 equation was derived as follows, using P as a symbol for PlC12
and rounding 1/12 to 0.083:
1. (po.083)12 = (P)
(The probability of exactly twelve out of twelve)
2. 12(PO.083)11(1 - p0.083) = 12(P)o.91r - 12(P)
(The probability of exactly eleven out of twelve)
3. (%)(122 - 12)(PO-083)10(1 - P0.083)2 = 66(P)0.883 - 132(P)o.017 +
66(P)
(The probability of exactly ten out of twelve)
4. 66(P)0.833 - 120(P)0.917 + 55(P) = PIC10 / 1 2
(The probability of at least ten out of twelve, which is the sum of the three
probabilities above; see note 22 supra).
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PIC10/12 = 55(PICa2 ) - 120(PIC 12)0 '92 + 66(PIC12)085 .
The PIC formula will always produce a lower probability than the
PIC10/ 12 formula, provided the same PIG1 2 probability is used in both
formulas. As PIC12 approaches zero, both probabilities approach zero,
and as PIC12 approaches 1.0, both probabilities approach 1.0. PIC6,
however, always remains lower than PIC10 /12. If PIC12 is between 0.10
and 0.90, as it is likely to be in reality, the difference is substantial. The
direction of these differences remains unchanged when the independent
probability model is converted into the combination independent and
collective model.
This comparison of PIC and PIC 10/12 shows that even without any
numerical estimates for the parameters, PIC, PGC, #G, and W, the
model presented in this Article can still be used to make comparisons
between different jury decision rules. Rank-order comparisons can be
developed for any two or more decision rules, reflecting their probabili-
ties of convicting or not convicting the innocent, the guilty, or the
average defendant.6 2 With numerical estimates of the parameters, more
precise comparisons can be made of degrees of difference rather than
simple rank order. In addition, one can compare the numbers of each
kind of error and thus determine an optimum jury size or fraction
required to convict.
The comparison of PICe and PIC1 01 2 also demonstrates that intuitive
notions about probability may be incorrect. Intuitively, one might believe
that the probability of convicting an innocent person under a 6/6 rule is
greater than under a 10/12 rule, because only six persons have to be
convinced of guilt under the 6/6 rule, but ten have to be convinced
under the 10/12 rule. That kind of reasonable thinking, however, does
not adequately consider how much easier it is not to have to convince
everybody on a jury, even though the total number of decisionmakers is
somewhat larger. Probabilistic modeling can identify and correct such
errors of commonsense when, as with jury size, direct experiments are
difficult or impossible.
Nevertheless, if the model is wrong or totally untestable, a purely
deductive approach may be just as useless as a purely empirical ap-
62. With a 10/12 or a 9/12 decision rule, a defendant may as well ask for a bench
trial. If we assume a judge is like a typical juror, and assume the meaningfulness of the
combined independent and collective probability model, then a defendant (whether in-
nocent, average, or guilty) has about as much chance of being convicted with a 1/1
rule as with a 10/12 or 9/12 rule. Compare the 10/12 and 9/12 lines of Tables 5 and
3 with the 1/1 line of Tables 4 and 2.
Vol. 1975:933]
Washington University Open Scholarship
978 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
proach. What seems to be needed is a basically deductive model, but
one based on as much empirical data as can be obtained. The main
empirical data we were able to use consisted of the Kalven-Zeisel
findings that twelve-person unanimous juries convict 64 percent of the
time in major criminal cases, and that the average juror votes to convict
67.7 percent of the time. Additional data might be obtained by inter-
viewing legislative policymakers and appellate court judges to determine
what trade-off weight they would prefer, and by interviewing judges,
prosecutors, defense counsel, and experienced defendants to determine
their perceptions of the number of guilty and innocent defendants per
1000 defendants.
With additional empirical data, we would have more confidence in
our optimizing model and in the more precise effects indicated for
alternative decision rules. As of now, we can consider the numerical
data we have used in our optimizing model and our causal analysis to be
illustrative data, designed mainly to demonstrate the methodology of the
model and the analysis. Even without data, the model is capable of
providing insights into the effects of different jury sizes and different
fractions required to convict, as well as the effects of different normative
and empirical premises on the optimum jury size or fraction required to
convict, when the weighted sum of errors is minimized. In addition, the
model can help persons recognize and understand the independent
probability and collective-mind aspects of jury decisionmaking.03
With estimated data, the model can do all those things better. And
with more accurate estimates, the model's capability for developing
better causal theories and policy judgments about jury rules and jury
decisionmaking would improve still further. Perhaps extensions of the
jury model could be applied to other kinds of committees or small
groups.64 Certainly, there is a substantial potential here on which
others may build.
63. Justice Powell seemed to be referring to the collective-mind or averaging per-
spective when in Johnson v. Louisiana, he stated, "the rule that juries must speak with
a single voice often leads not to full agreement among the 12 but to agreement by none
and compromise by all." 406 U.S. 356, 377 (1972) (concurring opinion).
64. For those who are more concerned with the optimum size and decisionmaking
fraction for multimember courts rather than juries, Tables 4 and 5 may provide sugges-
tive insights for analyzing those issues. See S. ULMER, COURTS AS SMALL AND NOT SO
SMALL GROUPS 4-7 (1971). The model is also relevant to the more general issue of
the number of individuals and the degree of unanimity that should be required to take
collective action in other situations. See generally J. BUCHANAN & G. TULLOCK, THE
CALCULUS OF CONSENT 63-84 (1962).
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